Conflict Management Division
Highlights
At a Glance
Agenda 30
Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels
Agenda 2063
Aspiration 3: Aspires towards a “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law”
Aspiration 4: Aspires towards a “peaceful and secure Africa.”
The realisation of Agenda 2063 is essential to achieving Aspiration 4, which aspires towards a "peaceful and secure Africa." The activities carried out by the Department through the CMD reflect the unwavering commitment of the African Union (AU) to this vision. Specifically, the Directorate's mandate will be to ensure:
Enhancement of support for the effective functioning of the PSC;
Undertaking analysis of threats to governance, peace, security and stability and developing responses;
Collation and provision of early warning information to the PSC and other relevant AU Policy Organs;
Development of conflict management options and initiatives;
Deployment of mediation and dialogue interventions;
Support the deployment and management of peace support operations towards the resolution of conflicts;
Provision of strategic support to specialized institutions (ACSRT; AFRIPOL and AUC-PCRD, African Commission on Nuclear Energy, etc.) involved in the promotion of peace, security and stability
PAPS Commissioner: Amb. Bankole Adeoye, Nigeria (elected in February 2021)
Conflict Management – Director: Dr. Alhaji Sarjoh Bah, Sierra Leone
@AUC_PAPS Hashtags: #AUPSC #COHA #YouthforPeaceAfrica #Youth4PeaceAfrica #Y4PAfrica #APSA #SilencingTheGuns #NeTT4Peace #theAfricaWeWant
"Robust and collective urgent action must be our “North Star” to serve as the guiding light, in combating the pervasive persistent global threat posed by terrorism” Amb. Bankole
About
Background Collaborative Actions Towards Peace, Security And Stability In Africa
In the last decade, while the amount of inter-state conflicts have reduced, the number and intensity of armed conflicts between state and non-state actors have increased. Several factors, including armed conflicts, terrorism, violent extremism, transnational crime, geopolitical tensions, human rights violations, proliferation of small arms and light weapons, climate-related risks, governance issues, and human security deficits, continue to threaten peace and security in various African countries. Unconstitutional changes of governments have further exacerbated the situation. It is imperative to analyse these complexities and implement comprehensive peace interventions with a focus on conflict prevention and peacebuilding, particularly in the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, the Great Lakes, the Lake Chad Basin, and parts of Northern and Southern Africa. Adverse consequences for civilian populations due to deliberate targeting by armed groups, humanitarian crises, internal displacements, and an influx of refugees into neighboring countries and beyond are only some of the enduring manifestations of these conflicts. Navigating these multifaceted political and security landscapes necessitates strong political will. This includes fostering inclusive governance, building robust institutions, ensuring accountability, promoting dialogue, and encouraging tolerance and reconciliation. Strengthening collaborations among the African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities and Mechanisms (RECs/RMs), the United Nations, as well as bilateral and multilateral partners is essential to support Member States in tackling the root causes of conflict and implementing their shared vision for sustainable peace, development, and prosperity in alignment with the goals of AU Agenda 2063 .
The collective efforts of the AU Peace and Security Council, Chairpersons of the Union and the Commission, Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, High Representatives, Envoys, Special Representatives, and the Conflict Management Directorate of the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department prioritise peacebuilding initiatives, encourage inclusive development strategies, empower women and youth, and foster strategic partnerships to achieve peace dividends and ensure human security for "the Africa We Want." The AU has also established specialized institutions like the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) and the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) to strengthen the desired coordinated response to common threats to peace and security in the Continent.
The realisation of Agenda 2063 is essential to achieving Aspiration 4, which aspires towards a "peaceful and secure Africa." The activities carried out by the Department through the CMD reflect the unwavering commitment of the African Union (AU) to this vision. The establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2004 has further demonstrated the vital role of the AU in addressing and responding to emerging and current political and security situations. The interface between the PSC and other pillars of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), such as:
- The Panel of the Wise
- The African Standby Force (ASF)
- The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS)
Specifically, the Directorate's mandate will be to ensure:
Enhancement of support for the effective functioning of the PSC;
Undertaking analysis of threats to governance, peace, security and stability and developing responses;
Collation and provision of early warning information to the PSC and other relevant AU Policy Organs;
Development of conflict management options and initiatives;
Deployment of mediation and dialogue interventions;
Support the deployment and management of peace support operations towards the resolution of conflicts;
Provision of strategic support to specialized institutions (ACSRT; AFRIPOL and AUC-PCRD, African Commission on Nuclear Energy, etc.) involved in the promotion of peace, security and stability
Strengthening the linkages between early warning and early response/action to reduce the high rate of vulnerabilities in Africa In the past two years, the Department has supported Member States in efforts to end violent conflicts, de-escalate tensions, and facilitate dialogue towards negotiating divergences. Using the early warning analysis ecosystem provided by conflict and regional analysts, specialist technical institutions, and Liaison Offices (LOs), the Department enables the PSC to implement its mandate of maintaining peace and security on the continent. The Department has provided strategic and operational support to anticipate, prevent, and respond to conflict, and to support and promote democracy and good governance in Africa either through its initiative or by supporting the implementation of the PSC's directives. As part of efforts to ensure that the PSC's decisions towards Silencing the Guns (StG) are efficiently implemented, the Department coordinated the development of a monitoring and evaluation framework for the implementation of the Master Roadmap of Practical Steps to Silence the Guns in Africa by 2030 . The PSC's adoption of the framework is a strong indication of its determination to work closer with the Department in addressing the continent's peace and security challenges. Notably, as part of enhancing engagement with decision makers, the Department has reinstituted the monthly early warning meetings between the Commissioner and the PSC Ambassadors. Such interaction is needed for the Department to provide strategic analysis promptly to relevant stakeholders to inform decisions for early responses towards the de-escalation of conflict situations and conflict prevention. Through the PSC Secretariat, capacity enhancement support is being provided to the PSC's Committee of Experts to enable the efficient implementation of the Council's mandate. In collaboration with Partners, the Department, through the PSC Secretariat, has sought to enhance the capacity of the members of the Committee of Experts to operationalise the Sanctions Committee in line with the Decision of the May 2022 16th Extra-ordinary Session of the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government. As part of our efforts to improve information exchange across PSC members, we created a digital repository that serves as an online hub for decisions of policy organs. The repository has been quite valuable in facilitating intra-departmental access to documents.Furthermore, the digital repository allows the PSC Secretariat to disseminate essential information in real time with PSC members and other stakeholders. The repository now includes PSC decisions. However, we plan to broaden its scope to also cover decisions made by all policy organs, and use it as a common platform for information sharing. Close, consistent interaction and responsiveness are critical elements of preventive diplomacy. Through the LOs deployed in countries emerging from challenging situations, the AU provides an on-the-ground presence that assists countries implementing peace agreements by reaching out in real time to address conflicts and provide relevant situational analysis and response options. LOs provide on-the-ground technical backstopping to processes involving the AU and its strategic Partners in the affected countries.
Close, consistent interaction and responsiveness are critical elements of preventive diplomacy.In South Sudan, the LO has been instrumental in the 2018 Revitalised Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. In March 2022, the AULO provided technical and administrative support to a trilateral team established at the PSC's request to evaluate South Sudan's electoral and constitution making needs, and to submit a report of the evaluation to the Council. The trilateral team comprised the Office of the United Nations (UN) Secretary-General, the Executive Secretary of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and the Commission. Unfortunately, our LOs are severely under capacitated. Since its establishment, the Department has made modest efforts to enhance the LOs' capacities. Through frequent interactions, it has addressed some of the LOs' pressing needs. However, the Offices' significant technical capacity and funding challenges are made worse by the Department's own capacity problems. If the Department had adequate capacity, it could provide backstopping capacity to the LOs on a need-to basis. However, in the current state, the Directorates have to rely on external expertise to provide the requisite support. This creates significant challenges, particularly concerning the cost-effectiveness of our approach and sustainability. Our ability to take full advantage of the opportunities provided by our LOs to prevent conflicts and meaningfully assist Member States depends on their being fully capacitated to deliver on their mandate. One way to enhance LOs' capacity in the interim is to request that our Partners provide needs-driven, time-bound backstopping support in relevant areas to the Offices while we develop medium- to long-term solutions. Preventive diplomacy and mediation Africa's decision-making bodies have reiterated the need for the AU to develop capacities to prevent conflicts in order to promote peace, security and stability. To this end, the AU has invested heavily in tools and mechanisms for dialogue to prevent and de- escalate conflicts. These include a robust system for early warning, the Panel of the Wise, the use of the good offices of the Commission Chairperson, the appointment of Special Envoys and High Representatives, and other emissaries. A dedicated division for supporting the efforts of these mechanisms and facilitating dialogue and mediation has been created within the Department of PAPS. At the launch of the new Department, Ethiopia, the AU host country, was embroiled in violent conflict in Northern Tigray. Building on earlier efforts by the Commission, the Department developed a strategy of engagement to support a politically negotiated settlement of the conflict. Drawing on in-house expertise and leveraging the opportunities provided through our strategic partnerships, the Department provided substantive and technical backstopping support to the High Representative of the Horn and the facilitator of the talks who led the mediation efforts on behalf of the AU. Through the concerted efforts of all stakeholders, the parties to the conflict in the Northern Tigray region signed a peace agreement in record time almost two years after the conflict began. The fast-tracked signing of the peace agreement came as a very welcome relief to Ethiopians and the rest of Africa and her friends. It is to be recalled that the Chairperson of the Commission received an award from the Ethiopian Government for the effective AU mediation/ facilitation role.
Signing a peace agreement is just the start of a peace processHowever, signing a peace agreement is just the start of a peace process. The Department has therefore put together a framework of consistent and sustained support to accompany the peace agreement implementation. Through synergised efforts, the Department will provide the necessary technical expertise to support the national authorities to transform the drivers of conflict, address the wounds of the past, and foster peaceful co-existence as well as mobilise much-needed post-conflict reconstruction resources. In Comoros, engagement by the Department contributed significantly to de-escalating the political contestations between the government and opposition political parties, which had lingered since 2019. The Report of the Technical Assessment Mission, which the PAPS Commissioner led, provided the basis for the PSC decision for the Commission o offer the Department's needs-driven technical support to Comoros on behalf of the Commission. Consistent efforts have been made to support the strengthening of our Organisation's facilitation, dialogue and mediation mechanisms to enable the effective delivery of their mandates. The Panel of the Wise (PanWise), the pre eminent consultative body of the Union for conflict prevention, management and resolution, has been revitalised. As part of our early response measures, members of the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation - FemWise - have been incorporated into election-related deployments to accompany the dialogue and mediation efforts of the Commission to prevent and de-escalate election-related disputes. As part of implementing the Continental Framework for Youth, Peace and Security, the Department facilitated the establishment of WiseYouth, a platform developed to promote the inclusion and participation of young people in national, regional and continental peacebuilding processes. A lot is required to support the effective functioning of these initiatives. Capacity development, innovation, dedicated backup that enables medium- to long-term engagements needed to support long-term peacemaking efforts, and a willingness by member states to harness the potential of these mechanisms are critical to attaining success. Improved cross-regional learning to enhance resilience Empirically generated knowledge is essential to early warning and prevention efforts. Africa's think tanks and academic institutions generate valuable knowledge and analysis. However, few avenues exist for the knowledge generated to influence continental and regional policymaking and practice. As part of the Department's new business model, platforms for enhancing structured and systematic knowledge sharing between Africa's think tanks and academic institutions and the RECs have been instituted. Africa's think tanks are convened through the AU Network of Think Tanks for Peace (NeTT4Peace) , a strategic partnership between Africa's research communities and the Department. This partnership provides a structured feedback loop that enables the Department to use evidence based knowledge generated by the research community for strategic inputs into policymaking and implementation. The Department in turn can provide structured feedback on knowledge products developed. Invaluable knowledge and experience have been gained by the RECs and RMs which have addressed various types of crises ranging from traditional conflicts and humanitarian challenges to violent extremism. These experiences have shaped policy development and practice in some instances, even at the continental level.
Invaluable knowledge and experience have been gained by the RECs and RMs which have addressed various types of crisesThere is however no structured platform for meaningful knowledge exchange and learning. Except for instances where one REC may decide to undertake a benchmarking exercise in another, there needs to be more cross-learning among RECs. To facilitate cross-learning and innovation among the RECs/RMs and the Department, the Inter-Regional Knowledge Exchange (l-RECKE) was established. The l-RECKE, launched at last year's mid-year Summit in Lusaka, Zambia, is expected to foster cross-lessons-learning between the RECs/RMs to encourage the replication of best practices. NeTT4Peace and l-RECKE offer convening platforms for knowledge exchange among and between peace and security practitioners on the continent to learn and innovate how best to enhance peace and security efforts. At the same time, they offer the Department communities of practice that provide valuable insights and feedback on the Department's peace and security actions. Promote information gathering and effective intelligence sharing to enhance early warning Early warning information provided to the Department is generally obtained from open sources. This means that some valuable information that may be outside the public domain may be delayed in coming to the fore, thereby limiting the information that feeds analysis. The Department's specialised technical institutions, such as CISSA, ACSRT and AfriPol, have the capacities to generate intelligence-based data to augment information generated from open sources to sharpen the lenses of analysis and response. In addition to the confidential briefs shared with the Commission, the Department, through its newly created knowledge management function, has initiated a Policy Paper series that offers the space for the specialised institutions to present some of their critical findings to a larger audience. The goal is to provide the PSC, Member States, Partners and staff of the Department with information on developments on the ground that may be limited in the public domain. In the year under review, the ACSRT produced three such Policy Papers:
Contemporary security challenges and crises are complex and fast-changing, necessitating synergised cohesive responses that promote durable solutions. The past two years have been particularly challenging for our continent as we battle the increase both in the number of actors and the scale and intensity of violent extremism and terrorism in the traditional epicentres. These are the Sahel region, Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin region and North Africa.
A significant challenge with the design of the PAPS Directorate is removing the Continental Early Warning SystemThere has also been an expansion of violent extremism and terrorism in non-traditional theatres, with a forceful drive into the littoral states of West Africa and in Southern Africa, including Mozambique's Carbo Delgado. Of particular concern are the recent attempts by those altering constitutional processes to justify their actions as efforts to address violent extremism and terrorism. A significant challenge with the design of the PAPS Directorate is removing the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS).This unit was primarily responsible for generating and collating early warning information to assist with producing alerts and response options. To address the gap created by this reform and ensure that the Department enhances its efficiency to deliver as one, we created integrated teams in the form of regional desks. The regional desks comprise region specific desk officers and conflict analysts who collaborate with liaison officers to provide relevant conflict analysis for action. It is recognised that a key first step to addressing the complex phenomenon of violent extremism is to have a better understanding of its drivers and dynamics, and the surge in unconstitutional government changes that are being touted as part of the response measures by some. The Department thus organised a Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government. The Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, the output of the Reflections Forum, provided valuable insights and pragmatic ways to address the phenomenon.
The first step to addressing the complex phenomenon of violent extremism is to have a better understanding of its drivers and dynamicsIn addition, through ACSRT expertise, the link between the rise in political instability including unconstitutional changes in government was explored in the Policy Paper
The realities of contemporary security challenges reinforce the need for coordinated multiple response effortsThe realities of contemporary security challenges reinforce the need for coordinated multiple response efforts. Ad hoc security initiatives, the coming together of a coalition of the willing to address existential threats, have gained currency in the constellation of tools for addressing security challenges. The Multinational Joint Task Force operating in the Lake Chad Basin area is the flagship ad hoc security initiative from which the Department is curating lessons. One of the lessons from AMISOM, reinforced by the experiences from the Lake Chad Basin context, is the fluidity between peacekeeping, stabilisation, post conflict reconstruction and development and peacekeeping. Cognisant of the need for multiple interventions to prevent, counter and manage the long-term effects of violent extremism and terrorism, the Department employs three main methods in its support efforts. The first is a multi-dimensional approach that supports the use of force to create an enabling environment for socio-political and diplomatic engagement. The second is support for the (re)establishment of governance in affected territories. And third, support for efforts towards socio-economic development. The Lake Chad Basin region has been our learning theatre for assisting in stabilisation efforts, and from there, the Department's strengths and areas in need of enhancement have come to the fore. We have identified that in situations such as in the Lake Chad Basin, where the AU provides strategic support, our comparative advantage is at least three-fold: the political legitimacy brought to the process; our ability to leverage the work done by various divisions of the Department to upscale impact; and advocacy for resource mobilisation. Through the AU Support Cell to the Multinational Joint Task Force, the Commission provides strategic support, including mobilising logistical resources to the Force. The AU-supported Regional Stabilization Strategy remains the blueprint for support to the efforts by all stakeholders towards laying the foundations for socio political and economic development in the affected countries. The Regional Stabilization Cell at its headquarters coordinates the Department's socio-political and governance interventions to affected countries. The Department continues to provide the Secretariat of the Lake Chad Basin Commission with political support and to accompany the efforts of affected countries with technical support and strategic coordination. As part of our determination to enhance synergies between our governance and military efforts at countering and preventing violent extremism, we have identified some valuable lessons regarding the implementation of the Regional Stabilization Strategy in the Lake Chad Basin region.
We recognise that although won at a high price, military victories are only a small part of the efforts at defeating terrorism. This is why the Department is invested in providing technical support to enhance governance
Although won at a high price, military victories are only a small part of the efforts at defeating terrorismin the affected territories of the Lake Chad Basin countries. In addition to coordinating intra-departmental efforts, the Department also works with Partners to provide technical support to the affected territories. One of the lessons identified has been the need for the proper sequencing of efforts within the various dimensions of support. The need for effective coordination for scaling impact has also been identified as one of the Department's comparative advantages. The changed nature of contemporary insecurities means that the clear lines of delineation between violent conflict and post-conflict situations are significantly blurred. We have therefore also had to change our way of doing things. Lessons from Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin area point to the need for critical interventions, even in the heat of conflict, to enable the success of military operations. We have acquired useful knowledge on identifying the needed support, the actors to deliver the support and benchmarks for transitioning to support for post-conflict reconstruction and development. Using the lessons identified, a stabilisation policy is being developed to guide our efforts within the space between active conflict and post conflict. Mobilising intensified support for peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction The AU Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) provides strategic guidance for post-conflict efforts. PCRD interventions have positively responded to Member States' requests for support through our LOs. In line with its context specificity and local ownership principles, the Department usually deploys technical assessment missions to countries needing assistance to identify, prioritise, and sequence needs jointly to ensure they receive tailored support. Even though the Policy and its subsequent auxiliary support frameworks have been pivotal in reinforcing countries emerging from challenging transitions, it had not been reviewed since its adoption in 2016. To enhance the Policy's relevance, particularly in the context of the evolving dynamics in the governance, peace and security domain, the Department, following relevant decisions by the PSC, including to mainstream peacebuilding, organised a review of the Policy. Against the backdrop of the many issues the Policy has to address, the review recommended, among others, the adoption of two new pillars -Youth and Environmental Security. These are important for ensuring inclusion and enabling relevant mechanisms and tools to address one of the most challenging contemporary issues - environmental security.
While externally sourced funds have proved invaluable to our actions, there are also limitationsIn recognition of the catalytic role of PCRD, the 2022 Humanitarian Summit and Pledging Conference held in Malabo directed that PCRD should be availed to returnees on the continent. Support to enabling a return to normalcy is already part of the Department's PCRD portfolio. Through Quick Impact Projects and Peace Strengthening Projects, our PCRD efforts have always focused on improving access to essential services as part of engendering trust and confidence and promoting peaceful co-existence. Therefore, the assignment by the Humanitarian Summit requires us to be innovative in the design of our support so that our interventions contribute to assisting with the resettlement and reinsertion of returnees in a dignified manner. We will no doubt need predictable funds to undertake meaningful PCRD. While externally sourced funds have proved invaluable to our actions, there are also limitations. Our persistent efforts to generate funding internally have yielded some positive returns with the PSC, which has agreed to allocate some of the resources under Window 2 of the Peace Fund to PCRD. This will be vital in enabling the implementation of the directive. The Department also undertook relevant action to operationalise the PCRD Centre in Cairo and expects that it will provide a much- needed re-centring of our PCRD and provide some signposts on ways to enhance medium- to long-term support to our Member States transitioning from challenging situations. Instant operationalisation of the African Standby Force (ASF) Declared operationally ready in 2015, the African Standby Force (ASF) is yet to be deployed. Even so, the processes for the full operationalisation of the ASF have provided a framework for enhancing Member States' capacities for standardised planning, deployment and management of peace support operations. Yet the past eight years have seen significant changes in the peace and security landscape. Within the period. Member States and RECs have devised innovative ways to address the existential security threats confronting them. Valuable lessons have been identified towards enhancing the ASF's operationalisation. In 2021, our Policy Organs approved and adopted the AU Peace Support Operations (PSO) Doctrine , which offers guidance on efficient deployments for addressing contemporary security challenges. The AU PSO Doctrine guides the standardisation of PSOs’ preparation, employment, management and liquidation. It offers clear signposts on the requirements for AU-mandated, -authorised and -endorsed missions. Since the AU PSO Doctrine is the umbrella strategic guidance on all AU PSOs, the Specialised Technical Committee on Defence, Safety and Security (STCDSS) directed that the ASF concept be reviewed for alignment with the Doctrine. Furthermore, the first lessons-learned conference on AU PSOs was organised in 2022 to curate the experiences from the AU's various PSOs. The conference provided a wealth of considerations that can inform a revised ASF. Following an expert workshop on the reconceptualisation of the ASF, which undertook a holistic review against the backdrop of contemporary security realities and the outcome of the lessons-learned conference, a proposal on the trajectory for the reconceptualisation of the ASF will be submitted to the STCDSS for political guidance on the process. Scale up global support towards financing of peace operations A fundamental challenge to the success of peace operations has been predictable and sustained funding. Despite consensus on the need for partnership peacekeeping, a pathway of sustainable financing has yet to gain traction.
A fundamental challenge to the success of peace operations has been predictable and sustained fundingTwo main issues hampered progress: a lack of clarity on the continent's position on financing; and the lack of a single architecture for guaranteeing human rights due diligence. The Department has addressed both. First, a Consensus Paper on Predictable, Adequate, and Sustainable Financing for AU Peace and Security Activities that details the AU's position and contribution to the financing of AU peace operations has been developed by the Department and endorsed by the relevant policy organs. Second, drawing from the practice of eliciting compliance over the years in the various theatres of war where the AU has deployed, a Strategic Framework on Compliance and Accountability has been developed and is undergoing the processes of endorsement by the relevant decision makers. We are also working with the UN towards developing a Joint Planning Guideline, which should clarify the roles and responsibilities of each Partner in the partnership towards maintaining peace and security in Africa. In addition to the efforts to obtain funding, particularly from UN-assessed contributions, Member States need to critically consider other resource mobilisation models to complement whatever is availed by the UN.
In light of the growing threat of terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organised crime in various parts of the continent, the Commission took practical steps to revitalise the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes , security mechanisms that were established to address the security threats in the Sahelo-Sahara and East Africa/ Horn of Africa regions respectively, through the promotion of intelligence sharing and shared policy interventions on common threats. To this end, the Commission, in collaboration with the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Mauritania , convened a technical-level meeting of intelligence services in Nouakchott, Mauritania from 5 to 7 November 2023. Participant countries included Algeria, Benin, Chad, Côte d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Libya, Mauritania, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Sudan and Tanzania . Related institutions and mechanisms that participated in the meeting included the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL), the Inter- Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Accra Initiative; the Abuja Fusion Centre; the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS); the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF), the AU Mission for Mali and the Sahel (MISAHEL), and the Fusion and Liaison Unit (UFL) of the Sahel countries.
The need for enhanced cooperation and coordination between the two Processes and the RECs/RMs was underscored in order to promote effective coordination for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and called on the Commission to develop their modalities. They agreed to conduct regular meetings at various levels at least once a year bringing together the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes, and the Accra Initiative, convened by the African Union Commission as the overall coordinator of these Processes.
CMD Divisions and areas of focus
AU Peace and Security Council AU Standing Decision-Making Organ
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) is the main pillar of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) , which is the framework for promoting peace, security and stability in Africa. It was established as a standing decision-making organ of the African Union (AU) for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. It is also a collective security and early warning arrangement intended to facilitate timely and efficient responses to conflict and crisis situations in Africa. The PSC was established pursuant to article 5(2) of the AU Constitutive Act (2000) and is specifically provided for under article 20 (bis) as inserted by article 9 of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act (2003). The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (PSC Protocol) was adopted on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa, and entered into force in December 2003. The PSC became fully operational in early 2004. The PSC Protocol, together with the PSC Rules of Procedure, the AU Constitutive Act and the conclusions of various PSC retreats, provides operational guidance to PSC activities. The core functions of the PSC Secretariat are that: a. The Secretariat serves as the repository and institutional memory of the Continental Peace and Security Council as it documents and archives all the activities, decisions, lessons learnt and knowledge products of the Council, and provides support for the retrieval of relevant information to support the Councils deliberations. b. Provides day-to-day administrative and logistical support to the PSC in its operations.
c. Prepares and organises PSC activities related to:
- Statutory meetings
- Retreats
- Field missions
- Annual High-Level Seminars
- Annual joint consultative meetings with RECs/RMs, CSOs and other relevant actors/institutions
- Annual joint consultative meetings with UN Security Council. EU Peace and Security Council, and League of Arab Nations Peace and Security Council
The African Union (AU) mediation support mandate is currently under the auspices of the Mediation and Dialogue Division (MDD) , located within the Conflict Management Directorate of (CMD) of the Political Affairs, Peace, and Security Department (PAPS). The primary mandate of the MDD is to spearhead the design and implementation of preventive diplomacy, mediation and dialogue strategies and operational plans for the AU Commission. This is premised on the Communique of the 665th meeting of the PSC, which requires the Division to provide relevant technical support to African mediation efforts on different levels, including through the Panel of the Wise and its subsidiary mechanisms. The Division is designed to strengthen and institutionalize the AU's preventive diplomacy and mediation efforts by establishing a systematic, professional,
and comprehensive mechanism that offers the necessary:
- technical
- logistical and
- operational support
Since the establishment of the African Union (AU) in 2000 and its Peace and Security Council (PSC) in 2002, the AU has played an increased and expanded role in addressing peace and security issues on the continent. Pursuant to this, it has developed the AU Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and deployed missions in Darfur, Burundi, Mali, the Central African Republic and Somalia, to cite a few. The AU is also increasingly seen as a key strategic partner of the United Nations (UN) and has demonstrated its capacity and comparative advantage to rapidly intervene in crisis situations through the deployment of multidimensional Peace Support Operations (PSOs) composed of military, police and civilian components . The African Union Commission’s Peace Support Operations Division (PSOD) , alternatively referred to as the African Standby Force Continental Planning Element, was set up pursuant to the provisions of Article 13 of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council (2002) and Article 18 of the Policy Framework on the Establishment of the African Standby Force and the Military Staff Committee (2004).
In this regard, the PSOD puts together policies, guidelines, agreements, frameworks and mechanisms to help bring together regional peace and security mechanism to respond to PSOs and security challenges on the continent. PSOD plans, launches, sustains, monitors and liquidates all Peace Support Operations (PSOs) authorized by the African Union Policy Organs (AUPOs) inclusive of the Peace and Security Council (PSC) and/or the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union (Assembly), as appropriate.
The landmark United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 stems from the Windhoek Declaration and the Namibia Plan of Action adopted in May 2000. The Declaration became a precursor to the adoption of the ground breaking UNSCR 1325 on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) in October 2000. Monitoring of the implementation of UNSCR 1325 has been one of the Security Council’s priorities. In recognition of the importance of women as equal partners in peace, security, governance and sustainable development, the African Union Commission (AUC) adopted the WPS Agenda and other protocols related to gender and security . This background prompted the development of the Continental Results Framework (CRF), with a total of 41 indicators (comprising of 13 indicators for AUC and 28 for Member States) under four pillars of Prevention, Protection, Participation, and Relief and Recovery, plus a theme on emerging security threats. The WPS Agenda presents a comprehensive approach to gender mainstreaming in peace and security to ensure women’s participation in conflict prevention and resolution, peacebuilding, and post-conflict reconstruction. It also preserves women’s rights in conflict situations and promotes their participation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding efforts. Therefore, the WPS Agenda is a gender-mainstreaming approach aimed at promoting women’s inclusion as active participants in maintaining peace and ensuring their protection and the integration of gender perspectives into the peace and security agenda at national, regional and continental levels. Within the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), the former Peace and Security Department (PSD) has launched the Gender, Peace and Security Programme (2015-2020) which aims at developing effective strategies for gender mainstreaming into Peace and Security to take into account men’s and women’s experiences and potentialities in building secure and stable societies.
The Programme contributes towards gender mainstreaming, debate and policy development in the field of women, gender, peace and security and in so-doing enhances the dialogue around women’s effective participation in peace and security in Africa, protection in time of conflict and recognition in the post-conflict phase. In furtherance of the above, the Gender, Peace and Security Programme will develop partnership for joint programming, enhanced coordination and policy formulation in this area by the AUC, the UN, the Regional Economic Communities and mechanisms (RECs/RMs), INGO, CSOs and other multi-lateral and bi-lateral partners working on these issues in Africa. Knowledge development and research will inform the development of long-term strategies and mechanisms to address AU priorities as highlighted in AU strategic plans and policy frameworks. The African Union Gender architecture, enshrined in the AU Gender Policy (2009), includes policies and legal instruments that address the issue of women, peace and security that have paved the way for an increase in the number of women in senior level position within the Commission; the nomination of women Special Representative in countries in conflict or emerging from conflict; women mediators and Special Envoys.
The establishment of the CEWS is a requisite of the PSC Protocol as detailed in Article 12 (1) which states that, “in order to facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts, a Continental Early Warning System to be known as the Early Warning System shall be established“; The Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) is one of the five pillars of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA).
Objectives
- To anticipate and prevent conflicts on the continent
- To provide timely information on evolving violent conflicts based on specifically developed indicators.
CMD Data Story
Deliver as One.
Conflicts Per Region
Conflict East
Conflict West
Conflict Central
Conflict North and South
Terrorism
IDPs
PSOs
PSC Responses
Major Milestones
Deliver as One.
The AU’s commitment to Silencing the Guns has yielded significant results, with positive breakthroughs achieved in Ethiopia and substantial contributions made to peace and reconciliation efforts in the Central African Republic, Mozambique, Libya, the DRC and support for the transition in Somalia . These accomplishments stem from the organisation's ability to enhance early warning systems and deliver effective response options for the Peace and Security Council and other decision-making bodies within the African Union and its Member States . The revitalisation of the AU Peace Fund has mobilised critical resources to bolster our Member States' capacities in conflict prevention and peace support operations, particularly in regions like the Sahel the Lake Chad Basin, the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa. These collaborative efforts demonstrate the commitment necessary to overcome obstacles and establish lasting peace and sustainable development, as part of the AU's contribution to maintaining peace and security.
Conflict Management Directorate
Engagement on Conflict Situations, Political transitions and Thematic Issues
Consideration of regional, thematic issues and other situations
Consultations with other African Union Organs/institutions
Engagement with RECs/RMs
Engagement with CSOs
Strengthening Partnerships for African Peace and Security
Other Engagements
PSC Field Missions -- Interactions with Member States and Stakeholders on the Ground
PSC participation on stakeholders' activities
Retooling the PSC working methods
Support role of the PSC Sub-Committees
Mediation and Dialogue
Panel of the Wise
FemWise
WiseYouth
Y4P
Operationalization of the ASF:
Training, Exercises
Force Generation
Pledged Capabilities
AU Doctrine on Peace Support Operations
The AU Compliance and Accountability Framework
Strategic Support Groups
Strategic Lift
Command, Control, Communication and Information Systems
The ASF Continental Logistics Base (CLB) in Douala, Cameroon
Continental Movement Coordination Centre (CMCC)
I-RECKE
Focus 2
Focus 3
Focus 4
Focus 5
Milestones: Security Situations
2024
Terrorism Threat in Africa
- 319. The 3,130 attacks recorded by November 2024, resulted in 12,753 deaths, including 6,586 civilians and 3,545 military/security personnel. Over 2622 terrorists were killed. Terrorist tactics included Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALWs) in 68.4% of attacks, IEDs (22.6%), kidnappings (5.2%), and mixed-method approaches (3.8%). Most affected countries included Somalia, Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Mali, and Cameroon, with terrorist groups such as Al- Shabaab, Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin (JNIM), Boko Haram, ADF- MTN and the Islamic State affiliates in various regions. The geographic spread of terrorism, weak governance, and exploitation of natural resources have contributed to the sophistication and adaptability of these groups.
Projections and Outlook
- 320. If current trends persist, terrorist activities will escalate further. In the Sahel and West Africa, political instability may result in a 10-15% increase in attacks, while Boko Haram and ISWAP activities in the Lake Chad Basin are projected to rise by 5-10%. Al-Shabaab is expected to sustain operations in East Africa, with cross-border incursions in Coastal West Africa anticipated to increase terrorist activities by 15-20%. Addressing these challenges requires urgent, coordinated actions targeting root causes and operational mechanisms.
Evolving Threat Landscape
- 321. Technological advancements have amplified the complexity of counter- terrorism efforts. Terrorist organizations increasingly use the Internet for recruitment, propaganda, and financing. The growing reliance on weaponized drones and IEDs highlights their technical sophistication. Weak border security has facilitated the spread of terrorism into previously unaffected regions, emphasizing the need for robust border management.
- 322. The Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, in partnership with the United Nations Office for Counter-terrorism (UNOCT), organized from 22 to 23 April 2024, in Abuja, Nigeria a High-Level counterterrorism meeting on “Strengthening Regional Cooperation and Institutions to address the Evolving Threat of Terrorism in Africa”. The High-Level meeting was intended to enhance multilateral counterterrorism cooperation, and reshape the international community’s collective response to terrorism in Africa, while emphasizing the importance of Africa-led and Africa-owned solutions. It allowed AU Member States and partners to reflect on the challenges and share best practices and lessons learned in addressing terrorism-related concerns, strengthening synergies in regional and sub-regional counterterrorism endeavors, and building the capacities of AU Member States affected by terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism
- 323. Despite ongoing efforts, significant challenges persist. The reliance on technology by terrorist groups outpaces many nations' ability to respond effectively. Inadequate coordination among African Union Member States undermines collective counter-terrorism actions. Limited financial resources and capacity-building initiatives further constrain efforts to address the evolving threats. Finally, the humanitarian crises arising from displacement, food insecurity, and human rights violations demand greater attention and sustained international support.
- 324. The African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) continues to face
specific challenges, including:
- Resource Constraints: Limited financial and human resources hinder the Centre's ability to fully implement its initiatives across the continent.
- Coordination Gaps: Effective collaboration with Member States and Regional Economic Communities (RECs) remains inconsistent, affecting the collective counter-terrorism response.
- Bureaucratic Delays: Prolonged internal processes slow down the operationalization of strategic initiatives.
- Evolving Threat Dynamics: Rapid advancements in technology used by terrorist groups outpace the Centre's current capabilities.
- Humanitarian and Social Impacts: Addressing the complex socio-economic factors, driving radicalization requires more comprehensive and sustained interventions.
- Update on the Continental Strategic Plan of Action
- 325. In fulfilling the decision of the AU May 2022 Extraordinary Assembly Malabo Declaration on Terrorism and UCG, the draft Continental Strategic Plan of Action has been finalized by the AUCTC and is currently being validated by RECs/RMs for updates and feedback. This strategic plan aims to align counter-terrorism efforts across the continent with a unified framework, ensuring coherence and effectiveness in addressing terrorism and violent extremism conducive to terrorism.
- 326. Additionally, the draft mandate, statute, and structure of the AUCTC have been updated and now set to undergo the internal approval process. These documents will provide the legal and operational basis for the Centre's activities, ensuring greater clarity and authority in its counter-terrorism efforts.
AUCTC’s Activities in 2024
- 327. The Centre implemented diverse initiatives
to enhance counter-terrorism capacity in Member States. These included:
- National Counter-Terrorism Capacity Assessments: Conducted in the Republic of Congo, evaluating legal and operational frameworks and border security practices.
- Capacity Building Programs that addressed preventing radicalization, countering violent extremism, and improving responses to terrorism.
- Collaboration with International Organizations: Partnered with NATO, ICRC, and others to address specific challenges such as humanitarian law, child protection, and counter-terrorism financing.
- Technical Assistance Missions: Supported regional organizations like SADC and EASF in developing counter-terrorism strategies, training curricula, and operational procedures.
- Thematically focused engagements: Focused on human rights, prison security, and the use of drones and IEDs in counter-terrorism operations.
- 328. To counter escalating threats, the following actions are recommended:
- Strengthen Regional Cooperation: Enhance intelligence-sharing, cross- border coordination, and border management to address terrorism’s transnational nature;
- Leverage Technology: Invest in cybersecurity and detection technologies to counter online recruitment and weaponized drones;
- Invest in Counter-Terrorism Capacities: Equip and train security forces with modern technologies and region-specific strategies;
- Promote Whole-of-Society Approaches: Address root causes through socio-economic initiatives and deradicalization programs;
- Enhance Humanitarian Responses: Mobilize resources to address displacement and food insecurity, strengthening regional frameworks for IDP and refugee management;
- Develop Comprehensive Strategies: Align national counter-terrorism plans with regional frameworks, incorporating legal, operational, and preventative measures;
- Foster International Partnerships: Deepen collaboration with global organizations to enhance technical support, resource mobilization, and training.
2023
- Terrorism and Violent Extremism were among the primary threats to peace, security, national stability, national cohesion, territorial integrity, and development on the continent during 2023. The phenomenon has, however, developed into a complex mix of ideology-driven acts of violence, due to the cooperation and growing linkages between terrorists, insurgence, and other criminal groups, linked to transnational organized crimes. This is manifested in the multiplicity of terrorist and violent extremist groups with varying motives and trajectories that are spreading and unleashing violence across the continent. The threats continue to mutate with new variants of inter-communal massacres, violent conflicts and a gradual but persistent expansion into new territories by global Al-Qaida and Islamic State (Da'esh)-aligned Terrorist and Violent Extremist groups who now have a presence in all regions of the continent, including West African Coastal countries. This expansion and control of a large swathe of territory allows terrorists and violent extremism groups to run their criminal economies in the areas under their control in conjunction with transnational organized criminal networks. Often, the local population benefit from these criminal economies.
- Across the continent, Member States and regional bodies have continued to review and adopt a series of counter-terrorism measures, including field deployments to deal with the threats of violent extremism and terrorism, which have contributed to degrading the capacities of terrorist groups to a greater extent. Through the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT), the Commission continues to support the capacities of Member States to respond to the threats posed by terrorism and violent extremism. These include the development and reviewing of national counter-terrorism strategies and plans of action, as well as the enhancement of Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) capacities, the development and delivery of tailored CT training programs, and the enhancement of CT Information exchange and Analysis through its Continental Counter-Terrorism Early Warning System (CT-EWS), including the publication of periodic analytical reports on the terrorism situation in Africa and various policy briefs during the reporting period.
2023 (continued)
- In addition, the ACSRT strengthened its partnerships and collaboration with various partners, including the UNODC, UNICRI, and the UNOCT, with whom it is developing Compendiums of Best Practices, European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training (CEPOL). In 2023, amidst logistical and financial constraints, the ACSRT, with the support of partners, undertook some capacity-building activities, which benefitted more than 1,000 African CT and PCVE experts, most of whom are Law Enforcement Officers, Military, Government Policy decision-makers,Judicial Officers and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). It is important to commend Namibia and Angola for directly financing National capacity-building activities delivered by the ACSRT.
2022
- The African continent continues to witness ever-increasing threats of terrorism and violent extremism, expanding both in magnitude and geographically, covering all five (5) Regions of the Continent with no exception. Beyond the Sahel, the threat is now spreading towards countries in the Gulf of Guinea such as Benin, Togo and Cote d'Ivoire. The activities of terrorist groups have led to enormous loss of human lives, massive destruction of property and infrastructure, destruction of livelihoods, and general socio-economic crises.
- From January to November 2022, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) database showed that the African continent registered over 1,385 terrorist incidents that resulted in over 9,564 deaths (that's an average of 6 death per terror attack). On average, the African Continent registered 4 terror attacks and average of 28 terrorism related deaths per day compared to 15 victims per day between 2017 and 2021. This in itself is a clear demonstration of increased lethality of the terrorist groups operating in Africa. Civilians are still its highest victims, over 5,344 in total for the reported period, with over 2,097 security and military personnel. It should be noted that a total of 2,123 terrorists died.
- This upward trend and continued expansion, in particular in the Sahel, is in itself yet another confirmation that despite the impressive military interventions, in particular by Foreign Military Forces in their various forms, in some instances dating as far back as 2012, the situation has not dramatically changed.
- In addition to the growing nexus of transnational organized crime and terrorism, including in its narco-terror form, the borders of the terrorism related threats are now shifting to cyberspace, further exposing member states to new forms of on-line criminality that they are not well equipped, both technically and financially to detect, investigate and respond to. The exploitation of new technologies such as new payment technologies and fundraising methods, 3D-Printing, Autonomous Weapons systems including Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), artificial intelligence, online disinformation, including through fake videos and the use of the dark and deep-web have added to the complexity of the security landscape.
- Through its various institutions spearheaded by the ACSRT, the African Union Commission continues to build capacities of AU Member States and RECs/RMs to prevent and combat terrorism and violent extremism in line with the AU instruments and frameworks. Through the ACSRT Continental CT-EWS, the Centre has assisted over 12 Member States in developing their National CT Strategies and Plans of Actions, establishment of 4 National CT Fusion Centres, 4 RECs in developing their regional CT Strategies, the establishment of Regional CT Fusion Centres, such as the one in Kampala and the SADC RCTC. The Centre is also in the process of publishing the First AU Comprehensive CT Training Manual and Anti-terrorism Training Modules including Detection and Neutralization of explosives, Critical Infrastructure protection, and Combating financing of terrorism, among other areas.
- It is equally important to note that adequate budget resources need to be allocated for these activities to allow the ACSRT to respond to Member States requests and the pressing and evolving threat situation. The cooperation and partnerships that are developing are dictated by the key objective of **sustainbility**, which will also guide the Multi-year Continental Strategic Plan on Countering Terrorism in Africa, in implemenation of the Malabo Summit Decisions. The implemention of the other important Malabo Extraordinary Decision of establishing the AU Ministerial Committee on Counter Terrorism (AUMCCT) is underway through the PSC.
- The current situation calls for an urgent recalibration of our approach to adequately address the threat in all its forms and manifestations mainly through comprehensive and multidimensional whole of government and whole of society approach, that effectively address all structural and fundamental root causes, drivers and possible factors that facilitate radicalization and violent extremism. The approach needs to be flexible with robust response enough to allow the ACSRT to adjust to the emerging and persuasive threats and respond to increased Member States needs in terms of information analysis and capacity building, as well as intelligence sharing. In this regard, the AUC underscores the need for the change of name of the Centre form the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) to the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), as well as to review its status and structure, to align it with similar international bodies, and improve synergies and efficiency of Member States in the fight against terrorism and violent extremism.
2021
- Terrorism continues to pose a severe and persistent threat to national, regional and continental peace, security and stability. Reports on terrorist activity across the globe in general and in Africa, in particular, have highlighted heightened efforts by extremist groups to exploit the COVID-19 pandemic as an opportunity to advance their agendas, consolidate their positions, entrench their roots into communities and attract new members to expand their reach.
- The threat of terrorism in Africa is influenced by a number of factors. These relate to Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF), Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), increased links with transnational organized crimes, Terrorism Financing, the proliferation of arms, weapons and ammunition, mercenarism/Foreign Fighters and consequences of political instability in Libya and the Sahel. Institutional, legal and structural weaknesses enable terrorist financing to flourish in Africa. Some countries in the Continent still lack the appropriate legal regimes to combat terrorism on the continent. In countries where it exists, the institutions tasked with identifying and addressing issues relating to terrorism are either under-resourced or cannot do so. The porous nature of African borders also enables the easy movement of persons, goods and money without effective detection.
- Through its specialized body - ACSRT, the Commission assisted
Member States and RECs/RMs in various ways in 2021, including, inter alia:
- a). Assistance to Member States and RECs/RMs in the development, elaboration and or review of their respective Counter-Terrorism (CT) Strategies and Programmes of Action. In 2021, such assistance was rendered to Lesotho, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, and the SADC Secretariat. Zimbabwe will benefit from the program as well in 2022.
- b). Legislative assistance was also provided to the ECCAS and the SADC Secretariats through workshops on Human Rights and the Rule of Law. Cameroon and Zimbabwe will also receive legislative assistance to develop their CT legal frameworks.
- c). Support was also provided to strengthen the technical capacities of Member States and regional bodies such as **the Central African Task Force on Money Laundering (GABAC) and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti-Money Laundering Group (ESAAMLG)** through workshops. In partnership with the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center (**KAIPTC), the UN Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT)**-Sudan, the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (FemWise-Africa) and the Swiss Government, similar efforts were undertaken to enhance the capacities of Member States on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE). The ACSRT collaborated with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) to develop a Toolkit on Early Warning and PVE; the toolkit will be implemented with SADC and the ECCAS.
- d). Production and dissemination of daily highlights, periodical bulletins, analytical reports, a joint analytical report with NATO, and policy briefs/papers.
- The ongoing cooperation with relevant UN entities, is progressing well. While implementing a joint legal assistance program to Member States from Eastern and Southern Africa regions, with UN Office on Drugs and Crimes (**UNODC), the ACRST** is partnering with UN Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate UNCTED and UNOCT to assist some AU Member States to establish National Counter-Terrorism Fusion Centres in addition to the development of a compendium of best practices for establishing such structures.
- To deepen the progress made in national and regional counterterrorism efforts, the Assembly may wish to encourage greater coordination and consultation among Member States towards creating synergies, avoidance of duplication and the efficient use of resources. In this regard, the Assembly calls upon the ACSRT to proactively engage with Member States, RECs/RMs and CISSA, as well as the Nouachott/Djibouti processes and the Accra Initiative, to better promote and coordinate intelligence and information sharing to effectively counter terrorist activities.
2024
- 425. AFRIPOL has strengthened its initiatives to combat transnational organized crime in Africa, prioritizing the disruption of criminal networks through targeted operations and collaborative strategies. Notably, AFRIPOL launched its first cross- border operation, Operation TAPI 2024, engaging countries including Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic. This operation led to significant seizures of narcotics, protected wildlife items, and forged documents, as well as the arrest of traffickers and dismantling of trafficking networks. These outcomes demonstrate AFRIPOL's dedication to addressing the socio-economic impacts of organized crime and building resilience against such threats across the continent.
- 426. In a critical collaborative effort with INTERPOL, AFRIPOL executed Cyber Surge 3.0 to address the growing threat of cyber-enabled crime, resulting in over 1,000 arrests and the dismantling of 134,089 digital infrastructures across 19 African countries. This operation targeted various cyber threats, including ransomware, digital extortion, and phishing scams, all of which have become prevalent challenges in Africa’s digital landscape. Cyber Surge 3.0 highlights AFRIPOL’s commitment to enhancing cybersecurity capacities and reinforces the importance of international cooperation in tackling cybercrime that increasingly threatens both public and private sectors across the region.
- 427. AFRIPOL’s approach also includes extensive capacity-building initiatives. Since January 2024, AFRIPOL has organized eleven specialized training sessions for African Union Member States, covering areas such as criminal intelligence analysis, digital forensics, financial crime investigations, and cross-border operations. These programs included intensive training on forensics and criminal intelligence, workshops on using smartphone applications for police operations, and cybersecurity awareness sessions conducted in collaboration with regional and international partners.
- 428. As part of the cybercrime-focused training, the trainees received donations of Spektor devices, Mobiledit, Shodan, and Maltego investigative tools and licenses to enhance their digital investigative capacities, particularly in combating cybercrime. These tools and skills empower law enforcement officers with the critical resources needed to counter organized crime networks effectively. AFRIPOL’s Central Criminal Analysis Unit further supports these initiatives by monitoring crime trends and providing actionable intelligence to Member States, thus reinforcing Africa's security infrastructure.
2023
- In light of the growing threat of terrorism, violent extremism and transnational organised crime in various parts of the continent, the Commission took practical steps to revitalise the Nouakchott and Djibouti Processes, security mechanisms that were established to address the security threats in the Sahelo-Sahara and East Africa/ Horn of Africa regions respectively, through the promotion of intelligence sharing and shared policy interventions on common threats.
2022
- Transnational criminal groups and networks contribute to the growing threat to peace, security and stability of AU Member States, to public health and to national, regional and continental security. There is also growing evidence to the effect that criminal networks continue to expand and diversify their activities and strengthen their link with non-state armed groups and terrorist organizations in the continent and globally. Poorly patrolled porous borders and ungoverned spaces are the main causes of the enduring cross-border criminality plaguing the Continent, including trafficking of arms and humans, drugs and psychotropic substances, contrabands, and other illicit goods, by transnational criminal networks and other armed non-state actors.
- For these groups to thrive, they need lots of finances, and efficient systems to move these funds to support their criminal activities.
- The African Union Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) as the AU's specialized institution for cooperation among the police for the fight against transnational organized crime, continues to facilitate police cooperation. The Commission, including through AFRIPOL, is continuing to support Member States to make it increasingly difficult for criminal networks and terrorists to move funds into, within and out of the continent.
2022 (continued)
- In 2020, according to United nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) report on economic development in Africa; Africa experiences on annual loss of 88.6 billion US dollars in illicit financial flows linked to criminal activities equivalent to 3.7% of Africa's GDP.
- AFRIPOL is also facilitating police cooperation through joint activities like simultaneous cross border operations, coordination meetings among the National Liaison Offices, and provision of training in identified areas. In the face of the increasingly transnational nature of crimes today, it is appreciated that the traditional national nature of crime prevention is untenable. This is what informs the push for cooperation among the police agencies.
- AFRIPOL has also entered into cooperation agreements and memoranda of understanding with organizations like INTERPOL, ASEANAPOL and AMERIPOL, and at bilateral level with the German Federal Police with the objective of developing and strengthening the law enforcement capacities and capabilities of the police agencies of the Member States.
- As various criminal groups like traffickers, smugglers, and terrorists continue to forge alliances, cooperation and interagency approaches for state security agencies is a necessity. Reliable and secure communication between the police agencies is essential for enabling and exchange of information and data. AFRIPOL has procured the requisite Information Technology (IT) communication equipment under its African Police Communication (AFSECOM) system .
2021
- Transnational organized crime remains a significant threat to peace, security and stability on the continent. Criminals, terrorists and armed insurgents alike seek to profit from criminal activities like smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs, humans, contraband and counterfeit products, among others. Criminals also increasingly use cyberspace to steal and launder money, illegally transfer funds, and carry out cyber-attacks on public and private infrastructure. The AU Mechanism for Police Cooperation (AFRIPOL) has continued to support Member States to detect and fight various crimes through targeted training and capacity building.
- These include fighting fraud and various aspects of cybercrime. In this context, AFRIPOL is concluding an MoU with the crypto-currency rovider COINBASE, which aims to provide for structured cooperation between AFRIPOL and COINBASE in supporting Member States to fight the illegal usage of crypto-currency. The support to Member States has reinforced commitment, coordination and collaboration between Member States to strengthen national law enforcement institutions, cross-border connectedness including beyond the continent on the fight against transnational organized crimes.
- AFRIPOL continues to strengthen the African Police Communication System (AFSECOM) as a secure system that police agencies can use to share information and data on criminal activities and networks and terrorist groups in the Member States. All AU Member States have received the essential equipment for the system, and efforts are underway to upgrade its technical capacities. With cybercrime cited as a fast-growing transnational crime facing AU Member States, a cyber-threat assessment was prioritized in 2021, under the cooperation between AFRIPOL and INTERPOL. The assessment generated the inaugural African Cyber Threat Assessment Report 2021 .This has helped develop mechanisms for cooperation in sharing cybercrime information, data and operational intelligence and in designing joint e-operations to fight cybercrime. Police cooperation beyond the continent is critical for an effective fight against transnational organized crime, and AFRIPOL continues to work with other police cooperation organizations to fight criminal threats to Member States.
a) Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism
- 274. Throughout 2025, Africa experienced a sustained high tempo of terrorist activity, with thousands of attacks recorded and an average of nearly 50 fatalities per day by the third quarter of the year. The defining characteristic of the threat was not only its lethality, but its consolidation into systems of parallel authority. Terrorist groups increasingly regulated movement, taxation, access to land and resources, and local dispute resolution, particularly in rural and borderland areas where state presence was weak or contested.
- 275. Key continental trends observed included: Expansion of extremist territorial influence across the Sahel and spillover toward coastal West Africa; worsening the links between terrorism with transnational organized crime, including illicit mining, fuel trafficking, narcotics, kidnapping-for-ransom, and maritime crime; increased use of emerging technologies such as drones, encrypted communications, AI-generated propaganda, and crypto-enabled financing; and convergence between terrorism, unconstitutional changes of government, and political fragmentation, undermining regional coordination and collective security mechanisms.
xiii. Regional Dynamics
- 276. The Sahel remained the epicentre of Africa’s terrorism threat. Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger functioned as a single interconnected ecosystem of insecurity. Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) and the Islamic State Sahel Province (ISSP) intensified both competition and expansion, together fielding an estimated force exceeding 3,000 fighters.
- 277. By the end of 2025, large portions of Burkina Faso outside Ouagadougou were under de facto extremist influence; Niger’s strategic border corridors remained persistently contested; and extremist mobility increasingly linked Sahelian theatres with coastal West Africa. These dynamics reflected a structural erosion of state authority rather than episodic insecurity.
- 278. Mali represented the most consequential risk monitored by the AUCTC in 2025. JNIM progressively implemented a strategy of economic warfare and coercive encirclement of Bamako through the interdiction of fuel and supply routes, particularly from Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire. By November 2025, this blockade triggered a nationwide fuel crisis, school closures, economic contraction, and the reduction of diplomatic presence.
- 279. AUCTC early-warning indicators suggest that, should current trajectories persist, 2026 could witness an unprecedented scenario involving prolonged isolation or partial takeover of a Sahelian capital by non-state armed actors an terrorist groups. Such an outcome would carry immediate regional and continental repercussions, which necessitate a more inclusive and coherent regional approach for combating terrorism and eliminating its root causes within a framework of regional cooperation.
- 280. The Sahelian crisis increasingly spilled into the Gulf of Guinea. Benin, Togo, Ghana, and Côte d’Ivoire experienced infiltration along forested borderlands, artisanal mining zones, and marginalized coastal communities. These developments point to a deliberate strategy aimed at securing logistics hubs, recruitment pools, and access to maritime trafficking routes.
- 281. Despite sustained military pressure, ISWAP and Boko Haram retained their resilience around Lake Chad through control of local economic ecosystems. In eastern DRC, the ADF/ISCAP further entrenched itself within illicit mineral economies. In the Horn of Africa, Al-Shabaab maintained fiscal autonomy, territorial depth, and cross- border reach, remaining the most operationally sophisticated extremist organization on the continent.
a) Counter-Terrorism and Violent Extremism continued
- 282. AUCTC analysis confirms that the persistence and expansion of terrorism in Africa are underpinned by structural drivers common across regions:
- i. Governance fragility, weak justice systems, corruption, and limited state presence ;
- ii. Youth marginalization, unemployment, and socio-economic exclusion;
- iii. Climate-induced stress, displacement, and competition over land and water;
- iv. Mature crime–terror nexuses embedding extremist actors in illicit economies;
- v. Weaponized information ecosystems and digital manipulation.
- Absent systemic intervention, these drivers will continue to outpace purely kinetic responses.
xiv. Emerging Technologies and the Digital Battlefield
- 283. The year 2025 confirmed the normalization of technology-enabled terrorism. Extremist groups deployed drones for reconnaissance and attacks, used encrypted platforms for decentralised command and control, exploited AI-generated content for propaganda and disinformation, and leveraged crypto-assets and mobile money to move funds across borders. Coordinated disinformation campaigns increasingly intersected with electoral processes and communal tensions, eroding public trust and complicating counter-terrorism operations.
- 284. The Draft Continental Strategic Plan of Action on Countering Terrorism in Africa was adopted at the expert level during the Consultative validation Workshop convened by the African Union Counter-Terrorism Centre (AUCTC) at its headquarters in Algiers on 15-16 December 2025, Algeria, bringing together representatives of Regional Economic Communities and Regional Mechanisms (RECs/RMs). This expert-driven process ensured that the Plan’s strategic pillars, operational priorities, and monitoring architecture were rigorously validated against regional realities and the frontline experience of RECs/RMs, which play a decisive role in cross-border threat environments. The adoption at this level reflects the need to present a technically robust, coherent, and implementation-ready framework before seeking political endorsement.
