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Amb. Bankole Adeoye

Climate Change Peace & Security

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Highlights

At a Glance

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Agenda 2030

Goal 16: Promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels


Agenda 2063

Aspiration 3: Aspires towards a “An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law”

Aspiration 4: Aspires towards a “peaceful and secure Africa.”

Vision :

The Africa Union’s Agenda 2063 makes it clear that climate-resilient communities and economies are an integral component of the continental vision for an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens, representing a dynamic force in the international arena.

Goal:To provide a continental framework for collective action and enhanced cooperation in addressing climate change issues that improves livelihoods and well-being, promotes adaptation capacity, and achieves low-emission, sustainable economic growth.

Overall objectives: Building the resilience of African communities, ecosystems and economies, and supporting regional adaptation.

AU Response: The AU PSC and Heads of State and Government decisions led to the conduct of the climate security risk assessment study and the Report of the Chairperson of the AUC on the Study on the nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security.

PAPS Commissioner: Amb. Bankole Adeoye, Nigeria (elected in February 2021)
Governance and Conflict Prevention - Director: Patience Zanelie Chiradza, Zimbabwe
CMD - Director: Dr. Sarjoh Bah

@AUC_PAPS Hashtags: #ClimateChangeAfrica #ACRA #COP21

climate change was a ‘threat multiplier that we should collectively address. … We remain resolute to contributing to the Common African Position on climate change peace and security in close collaboration with relevant actors’ Amb. Bankole

About

Climate Change
Peace
&
Security
Introduction & Background

Climate-related security risks are increasing across the African continent, in particular around natural resource competition, access to food, water and energy, migration and displacement, and armed groups. Climate change exacerbates existing security risks and threats through stressors which negatively impact peace and security in Africa. Droughts, floods, storms and sea level rise cause disasters, migration and forced displacement leading to humanitarian crises and conflicts. As a result, food, water and energy insecurity have intensified on the continent, with increased competition over natural resources, loss of livelihoods, cross-border disputes and transnational organized crimes.

At the same time, insecurity and conflict are further driving environmental degradation and hindering climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts.

  • Climate change is a pressing developmental issue worldwide.
  • IPCC concluded that the global temperature has warmed by 1.1oC since 1990.
  • Historical warming is on course to reach or exceed 1.5OC unless there is a deep cut in global emissions.
  • The Paris Agreement outlines the broad policy tools for framing the collective efforts to maintain the global temperature well below 2oC
  • Africa accounts for ~4% of global greenhouse emissions.
  • Africa is the worst affected by climate change due to a lack of adaptation capacity, high vulnerability and instability.
  • Climate Climate change has become widely recognised as a global security concern with a significant focus on Africa.
  • The threat multiplier effect in conflict-affected regions “fragile states”.
  • Climate Security aligns with global security concerns and integration of climate issues into existing security and defence.
  • Climate change acts as both a catalyst and an opportunity for such a rethink
  • Integrating climate change adaptation and finance into a ‘peace continuum’ spanning prevention, peacebuilding and development.
In order to break this vicious cycle of increasing climate change, environmental degradation, insecurity and instability, ambitious action is needed. Addressing the links between climate change, peace and security is a key building block for development more broadly and a stable, peaceful and prosperous continent.

Africa is strongly mobilized for Climate Action at all levels as evidenced by the framework of the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032).

It is equally reflected in the progress of continental and regional initiatives such as the African Renewable Energy Initiative, the Africa Just and Affordable Energy Transition Initiative, the African Adaptation Initiative, the Adaptation of African Agriculture Initiative and the African Women’s Climate Adaptive Priorities. Other relevant initiatives also include the Alliance for Green Infrastructure in Africa, the Great Green Wall, as well as the Climate Commissions of the Congo Basin, the Sahel and the African Island States.

The diversity and scale of the negative current and anticipated impacts of climate change in Africa, and its concurrent security challenges, highlight the need for mainstreaming the climate change, peace & security nexus in Africa. The African Union Peace and Security Council (PSC) indicated the importance of this mainstreaming endeavour in 2016. The PSC, once again, underscored in 2018 the importance of the AU Commission (AUC) to mainstream climate change in all its activities, particularly in early warning and prevention of climate change-related violent conflicts. In addition, a study was requested on the nexus between climate change, peace and security in the continent stressing, among other things, that the envisaged study should pay particular attention on the plight of island Member States. This issue remains of interest to the Peace and Security Council as reiterated in April 2022.

Moreover, in February 2022, the Assembly, in its 35th Ordinary Session, requested the Commission to “expedite the finalization of a climate-related security risk assessment study, in consultation with Member States”. The Tangier Declaration of October 2022 also emphasized the need for the AU, the UN and their strategic partners to support “the African initiatives and strategies in order to eradicate the negative impact of climate change on peace and security in Africa”. The July 2023 Nairobi Statement on Climate Change, Peace, Security and Stability in Africa equally acknowledged that “the ever-growing adverse impacts of climate change have deleterious consequences on the sustainability of peace, security and stability across the African continent especially on fragile communities”.

The collaborative efforts between the AU Departments of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS), and Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE) have resulted in a comprehensive Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA).

This study further informed the development of the Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Climate, Peace, and Security Nexus for which the preliminary drafts have been presented to the PSC in November 2023 and at COP28. The two documents together with the planned transcontinental consultations will inform the development of the Common Africa Position on the climate change, peace and security nexus.

Building on the findings of the Common African Position Methodology Workshop held in Addis Ababa (May 9-11, 2024), all AUC member states, RECS/RMs and Africa Climate Commissions have been consulted. The consultation has validated, through empirical data and member state experiences, the key climate change, peace, and security risk pathways as informed by the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment. This collaborative approach has informed the development of a whole-of-Africa informed and owned document, the Common African Position on the Climate, Peace and Security Nexus. The consultations have presented a zero draft of the Common African Position, incorporating these risk pathways, to gather further insights and ensure the final document reflects the continent's diverse realities.

Emerging Issues on the Climate Change Peace and Security Nexus

Climate impacts are compounding other pressures and are changing the access and availability of natural resources. The impacts of climate change on natural resources such as land, water, and forests are manifold across the African continent. Where small arms are readily available, histories of conflict or social and ethnic cleavages exist, groups are marginalised, and natural resource management and conflict management institutions are challenged, this competition can turn into violent conflict.

Food, water and energy insecurity, exacerbated by climate change, can drive a number of security relevant challenges, in particular for already vulnerable population groups. For example, the interruption in the provision of food, water and energy or their fast increases in price can feed into pre-existing grievances and act as triggers for political instability.

Climate impacts are accelerating several mobility trends. By far the largest migration trend that is impacted by climate risks is migration within countries, in particular from rural areas to cities. By putting rural livelihoods under pressure, climate impacts are accelerating rural-urban migration. Climate change is also increasing the frequency and severity of weather-induced disasters, and with it, the risks of displacement. At the same time, conflict is also a major driver of displacement and displacement often goes hand in hand with several risks, in particular when it comes to the vulnerability of certain groups (women, youth, people living with disability, the elderly).

Climate-related security risks are providing a fertile breeding ground for non-state armed groups such as militias, terrorist and criminal groups in Africa as they increase the pressure on state institutions. Non- state armed groups often use governance gaps to further undermine state institutions and build their own legitimacy and strength by providing cash and humanitarian aid in the aftermath of droughts, conflict resolution mechanisms and access to justice for disputes over natural resources and even building their own schools and providing education opportunities to the local population. For example, climate impacts such as droughts can drive recruitment towards illegal fishing, trafficking activities, and piracy. Furthermore, armed groups also often deepen environmental challenges: illegal resource extraction and environmental crimes such as poaching, and illegal logging and mining are often an important source of revenue for these groups.

The way climate-related security risks play out on the African continent is highly dependent and influenced by several external risks and pressures. Many African countries are highly dependent on food imports and thus on the policies in food producing countries and on global markets. Food price shocks strongly affect local food security and provision which when disturbed can increase grievances and political instability. Energy price shocks have also negatively impacted many African governments that have lacked fiscal leeway to put in place wide-scale measures to counter rising energy prices. In addition, the projected emergence of climate-related border tariffs designed by some of Africa’s trade partners may have deeply negative impacts on African economies and livelihood. Indeed, Africa holds a substantive amount of the world's mineral reserves. These minerals are crucial for the green transition and include cobalt, manganese and lithium. As the demand for critical materials essential to clean energy technologies is rising, it brings risks and opportunities for Africa as Africa needs to avoid mirroring the export of other raw materials from the continent without leaving much value added and instead maximize the benefits of its rich mineral reserve for its people.

While there have been significant improvements in terms of capacities to assess and address climate- related security risks, there are still significant gaps: African research capacities are still lagging behind. From 1990–2019, climate-related research on Africa received less than 5% of global funding and more than three quarters of this funding went to EU and north American institutions and less than 15% to African institutions. This trend is also mirrored for research on climate-related security risks with most of the capacities to conduct such research being concentrated outside of the African continent.

While there are regional strategies addressing climate-related security risks, similar strategies on the national level often do not exist, creating implementation gaps. A significant barrier to implementing climate security strategies is the lack of clarity regarding ownership and coordination of these topics on different levels. Some regional organisations such as IGAD and ECOWAS have dedicated structures and mechanisms, while others still have not created such institutional arrangements. This is largely mirrored on the national level where responsibilities are spread across different sectors and ministries. This fragmentation inhibits the development and execution of coherent and effective climate security policies. Governments often also lack mechanisms for effective coordination and collaboration between national and local stakeholders to ensure the integration of climate-related security risks.

The financing gap for both climate action and peacebuilding and conflict prevention remains enormous. The latest IPCC report states that annual climate financing flows to the African continent are billions behind the lowest adaptation cost estimates. And of the existing commitments not enough are being dispersed: between 2014-2018 less than half of commitments were disbursed. And more than half of all the climate-related investments are concentrated in only 10 African countries. The current flow of funds for adaptation in Africa is insufficient and falls billions of dollars short of the estimated minimum cost. Meeting the targets set out for adaptation in the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in Africa would require an additional funding of 41.3 billion USD annually.

The African Development Bank has stated that Africa will require $2.7 trillion by 2030 to address its climate change needs. Existing Financing is not going to those contexts and countries that are the most vulnerable to climate impacts and security risks. The Green Climate Fund (GCF) acknowledges that co- financing for Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and African states that are affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) experiencing medium-intensity conflict and high institutional and social fragility is comparatively lower than the co-financing leveraged in other African states. An analysis of almost 1000 projects, representing US$14.4 billion, conducted in 146 countries, including 56 fragile states, revealed that conflict and fragility might hinder access to and implementation of climate finance. Projects supported by vertical funds in extremely fragile states are much smaller than those in fragile or non- fragile states. From January 2014 to June 2021, only one extremely fragile state from Africa had access to vertical fund climate financing. A similar study on climate funding in conflict and fragile states found that as of 2020, less than a third of all GEF-funded projects were implemented in conflict-affected contexts. Furthermore, some projects in conflict-affected African countries were cancelled, dropped or increased the duration of delays because of security issues.

Findings on the Study of the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security

Africa is leading in institutional innovations and cross-sectoral cooperation to address climate-related security risks
Recent years have seen a strong increase in the creation of dedicated institutions and cross-sectoral cooperation mechanisms to address climate-related security risks. Globally, Africa is an innovative leader in this area. The are major ongoing collaborative efforts between African regional organisations and the AU, the UN system, government agencies, and civil society organizations, to address the impact of climate change on peace and security in their region. Different organisations have also started to create dedicated climate-security positions and capacities: the UN Regional Working Group on Climate Change, Environment, Security and Development (UN-CCESD), the UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa have their own dedicated environmental and climate-security advisers.

The ‘Climate Responses for Sustaining Peace’ initiative launched by the Egyptian COP27 presidency is a continental effort to facilitate African knowledge sharing and capacity building focussing on climate adaptation and peacebuilding. The African Development Bank Group's strategy for addressing fragility and building resilience 2022-2026 focuses on building resilience to various vulnerabilities, including climate change and it aims to address the root causes of conflict and fragility and emphasizes investment in crisis prevention across different fragile countries. Another interesting initiative is the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative (ACMI), a collaboration between the African Union Commission, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the International Organization for Migration (IOM), and the World Bank created in 2021 to generate political momentum and a common policy agenda on climate mobility in Africa, and to support implementation capacity and partnerships on the continent.

In addition, the request at the 1163rd meeting of the PSC held at Ministerial level on 21 July 2023 to the AU Office of the Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security to integrate issues relating to Women in Development and Climate Change, in its future forums, taking into consideration the outcomes of the meeting on “the overarching challenges of climate change and the women’s agenda” organized on 16 February 2023 on the margins of the 36th Summit of the African Union, is yet another positive development. Finally, CGIAR, a consortium of international research organisations, has started to create dedicated climate security initiatives across the continent.

Early Warning and early action systems are improving, but key challenges remain to integrate the climate change, peace and security Nexus
Early warning analysis to inform planning and action is a major component of addressing climate-related security risks. They are also at the heart of prevention strategies, both in terms of preparing for natural hazards but also addressing violent conflict or other threats to human security. Collection and analysis of disaggregated data on the Climate Change, Peace and Security nexus are important to address multi-dimensional vulnerabilities, but unfortunately large parts of the African continent suffer from severe shortcomings in hydro-meteorological infrastructure and services as well as multi-hazard monitoring capacities. Less than half of African countries have Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) systems, largely due to poor access to and availability of reliable data. Those systems that exist often suffer from quality issues. Despite these challenges, several organisations and African governments have undertaken efforts to develop EWEA systems that integrate both climate and security risks across the continent. These systems focus either the local, national, regional, or continental level.

The AU has two major EWEA systems that look at the climate-conflict nexus. Firstly, the Africa Multi- Hazard Early Warning and Early Action System (AMHEWAS) programme, which is embedded in the Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment department (DARBE). It aims to integrate four elements of early warning, namely risk knowledge, monitoring and warning services, risk communication and response capacity. Outputs from AMHEWAS, such as the weekly Continental Watch, focus almost exclusively on the forecast of natural hazards, such as extreme precipitation, flooding, and storms, but without drawing linkages with existing vulnerabilities regarding peace and security. Secondly, the AU Commission for Political Affairs, Peace and Security (AUC- PAPS) department has the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), which was created as a tool for the anticipation and prevention of conflict within the broader framework of the Africa Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) by focusing on conflict drivers such as poor governance, poverty, transnational organized crimes, inequality and exclusive practices and tendencies. CEWS does not draw interlinkages between climate change, environmental issues, and conflict and insecurity trends.

There have been efforts to strengthen collaboration across those two pillars by developing for instance joint outputs focusing on both climate and environmental indicators as well as peace and security data, but such initiatives have not been operationalised. Apart from these AU early warning systems, there are some other regional initiatives, most notably the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD) African Multi-Hazard Advisory Centre (AMHAC), established in late 2022 in Niger, which aims to further enhance the continental capacity to generate regular continental hazards and disaster situation reports, continental climate trends and impacts as well as impact-based advisories and watches. Similar as to AMHEWAS, its role is to support national meteorological services and other stakeholders during hazard seasons, but it does not comprehensively integrate non-climatic indicators.

At the national level, concrete examples for countries that have strengthened their Early Warning and Early Action Systems have shown, for example, that the early warning strategy and relocation of communities confronted to disasters prevented a significant death toll, especially when comparing to casualties in previous disasters or with some other regional countries with less developed EWEA systems.

At the local level, EWEA systems are known to be most effective when integrated into community and informal networks.

KEY MESSAGES ON THE CLIMATE CHANGE, PEACE AND SECURITY NEXUS


Following an inclusive consultative process in Africa, 15 key messages on the climate change, peace, and security were presented at the COP 27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt - November 2022.


  • "A peaceful and stable continent can be an enabler for climate ambition and action, while instability, including conflict, terrorism and violent extremism can be a barrier to same;"

  • "Climate Change has indirect negative impacts on Peace and Security, while instability also has direct impacts on climate change and the environment; "
  • A good knowledge of the complex linkages between the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus and Development can facilitate effective preventive, adaptation and mitigation efforts in all of Africa;
  • Responses to climate change security-related risks and threats require a Common African Position, national ownership, and coordinated and context-specific African approaches;
  • Climate financing remains the fulcrum in promoting the green transformative agenda in Africa towards peace, security, stability, humanitarian support and relief, socio economic growth and sustainable development and, thus, requires partner support;
  • Strengthened continental early warning systems are essential in preventing disasters and supporting disaster risk reduction and adaptation, which is a major priority in Africa towards building resilience and promoting sustainable livelihoods;
  • Water, food and energy are essential components of human security that are consistently threatened by climate change impacts, including conflicts, and as a result require urgent attention;
  • Climate Induced Displacement, mobility or migration are both adaptation strategies and peace and security stressors that require appropriate responses or strategies;
  • Just transition pathways, reflected in equitable and contextual approaches to climate change adaptation and mitigation efforts, are essential in providing equal opportunities for growth and development as part of conflict prevention and stabilization efforts in Africa;
  • 10
    Failure to properly address Climate Change Loss & Damages in Africa serves as a threat multiplier and exacerbate vulnerabilities;
  • Women, children, youth, people living with disabilities, the elderly, internally displaced persons and refugees are the most-affected by climate change security-related risks and threats; they are vulnerable and have special needs that must be addressed; and have major roles to play in conflict prevention and silencing the guns in Africa;
  • 12
    Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development programmes and projects
    are essential in climate security and environmental protection, in order to prevent a relapse into violence or conflicts, and for promoting climate action and peace-building initiatives in the post-conflict and stabilization phases;
  • 13
    Economic shocks and trade disruptions
    , caused mainly by conflicts, wars and health pandemics, worsen climate change responses, and require climate change and environmental diplomacy for containment;
  • 14
    Responses to environmental and climate change security impacts
    must not be identified, designed, and implemented in silos, but must adopt a multi-disciplinary and multi-sectoral approach, based on capacity-building, and technology transfer and development;
  • 15
    Climate Change fragility and vulnerability assessments, as well as security profiles,
    are required within the various Regional Economic Communities/Regional Mechanisms in order to aid effective, holistic and coordinated responses within the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus and its interlinkages with Humanitarian, and Development issues.

AU Response to Climate Security

AU Decisions

  • PS Press Statement (PSC/PR/BR. DCCLXXIV) May 2018 : – The AU-PSC requested the AU Commission to conduct the study on the nexus on “the link between climate change and conflicts in Africa and addressing the security implications.”
  • PSC Communiqué of 1051st Meeting, 26 Nov 2021 – “expedite the finalisation of a climate-related security risks assessment study, in consultation with Member States, and to define the varying security impacts of climate change on the African continent, while taking steps towards mobilising a Common African position towards climate change and security”
  • PSC Communiqué of 1079th Meeting, 21 April 2022 – “expedite the finalisation of the Report of the Chairperson of the Commission on the Study on the nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security”
  • AU Assembly Decision of February 2022 - the Assembly, in its 35th Ordinary Session, requested the Commission to “expedite the finalization of a climate-related security risk assessment study, in consultation with Member States as well as to expeditiously develop the Common African Position on the nexus between Climate, Peace and Security…”.
  • AU Assembly Decision of February 2024 – the Assembly, in its 37th Ordinary Session , requested the Commission to expedite the finalization of the draft Report of the Chairperson of the AU Commission on the Study on the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace and Security and the development of the Common African Position taking into consideration the contributions from all AU Member States and RECs/RMs, to deepen the understanding of the nexus, and to be submitted to the PSC for consideration.

Towards A Common Understanding On Climate Security

towards a common understanding
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

  • Combining climate lens & peace and security lens leads to comprehensive climate security perspective
  • Focusing on direct and indirect linkages (e.g. humanitarian disasters & conflicts)
  • ‘Human security’ is impacted by these linkages through climate security pathways
  • In effect, climate change leads to conflicts and undermines human security through intervening factors including mobility, migration and competition over limited natural resources

Frameworks and Impact
 DPAPS will closely collaborate with DARBE to coordinate the climate security cluster. Achieving More Through Collaboration to achieve the following:

  • Develop and Adopt a Common African Position on the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus: Unify Africa’s voices and actions to address the Nexus through such a position based on the insights of the Report of the Chairperson and the guidance of the Member States.
  • Building and implementing a Collaborative Framework on the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus
  • Enhancing Climate Security Governance at National, Continental and Global levels: Climate Security Negotiation Support and capacity strengthening
  • Promote conflict-sensitive climate financing: Establishing a concerted approach to bridge the financing gap for adaptation, mitigation, and risk management.
  • Develop knowledge on climate security and foster partnerships for impact in communities.

Regional Risks Analysis and Currently Implemented Responses in Africa

Northern Africa Analysis & Implementation

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  • Rising water insecurity: North Africa is already experiencing the impacts of water insecurity. The region is one of the driest in the world and has restricted water resources. A combination of receding supply, driven by climate change impacts, and rising demand has several important security implications: as water resources are getting scarcer and agricultural livelihoods are increasingly under pressure, this pressure can contribute to grievances and political instability.
  • Food Security challenges: Changing climatic condition and rising water scarcity endanger domestic agriculture and deepen the region’s reliance on imports. Food price shocks occurred despite high food subsidy regimes across the region. In the next years, climate change will likely lead to further market shocks and the cost of food imports compared to GDP is to increase further.
  • Fossil fuel dependency and the green transition: Northern Africa remains largely invested in the extraction and use of fossil fuels. Despite policy reforms, the region still subsidises fossil fuels for consumers, which further lock in a fossil economy and as long as fossil fuel prices remain high. The countries most exposed to transition risk have the least incentive to diversify their economies and so are the least prepared to deal with its effects; and
  • Human mobility, migration and displacement: Both internal and regional migration are set to rise as consequence of climate change, through environmental challenges causing displacement, and its follow-on effects, such as loss of livelihood and conflict. While migration is an important adaptation measure, it can also become a driver for tensions and conflict.

Key Regional Responses:
  • Managing fossil water reserves: As the fossil aquifers are largely transnational, they require monitoring on a regional level. Regional data on fossil aquifers can be the base to avoid unsustainable depletion and contamination.
  • Climate Security Networks: Regional organisations partly or completely encompassing the Northern African region have initiated debate on climate security issues.
  • Infrastructure and restoration projects: Northern African states have demonstrated successful leadership with ambitious projects to restore and protect the natural and man- made environment against climate change.
  • Subsidy reform: Northern African states have begun tackling subsidy policy reform. If conducted correctly, subsidy reform can reduce certain climate security risks and increase the resilience of Northern African populations.
  • Green transition: Several Northern African states have successfully attracted international investments to boost their renewable capacity; and
  • Adopting sustainability: Northern African states have begun adopting numerous projects at different scales dedicated to improving sustainability which will also address climate security risks.

Western Africa

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  • Food and livelihood insecurity: The impacts of climate change on food systems are likely to have negative impacts on food security. As West Africa provides around 1/3 of the food needs of the continent, disruptions to the region’s food system may have important food security implications beyond its borders.
  • Natural resource competition and conflicts: Modified natural resource availability throughout the region due to climate impacts, with water and fodder reserves declining because of droughts and flooding, and land degradation accelerating, aggravates conflicts such as agro-pastoral incidents, disputes over dwindling fish stocks, and tensions over land and forest sharing and tenure. Armed groups can leverage this context by settling disputes and recruiting disgruntled communities, particularly youth.
  • Changing migration patterns: Climate change contributes to sudden changes to displacement, transhumance and forced immobility, impacting the security of populations, be they on the move, hosting or involuntarily immobile. The loss of traditional mediation mechanisms deepens risks that disputes grow into violent conflict.
  • West African cities as hotspots of climate security dynamics: Almost half of the West Africans live in cities, and the urban population is still growing rapidly. Rural exodus is an adaptation strategy that will likely intensify as climate change impacts increase, deepening sub-urban poverty and leading to insecurity.

Key Regional Responses:
  • Transboundary cooperation in resource management: Transboundary resource management cooperation has been one of the major axes of regional policy on climate security. Apart from transboundary water management, collaboration exist in numerous other domains to strengthen climate resilience, such as the Great Green Wall initiative.
  • Risk planning and early warning systems: Relevant regional initiatives include the ECOWAS’ Early Warning and Response Network (ECOWARN), the Permanent Inter-State Committee for Drought Control in the Sahel (CILSS) along with its regional centre Aghrymet and WANEP’s regional early warning system, which is focused on conflict, integrating aspects of the climate security nexus.
  • Conflict-sensitive climate adaptation and climate-informed peacebuilding: Existing climate action in the region is focused on adaptation to bolster livelihoods, tackle armed opposition, ensure sustainable access to natural resources, develop and implement conflict-sensitive climate adaptation plans and link the Women, Peace and Security agenda with climate and environmental issues. Conversely, several peacebuilding efforts in West Africa have a clear environmental or climate focus; and
  • Integrated interventions: Various efforts in West Africa consider climate security as a way to address a multitude of issues in the region, holistically across natural resource governance, resilience and adaptation, sustainable resource use, disaster risk reduction and preparedness. The region has thus witnessed the creation of an ECOWAS-UNOWAS Working Group on Climate Change and Security, and the establishment of a UN Regional Working Group on Climate Change, Security, Environment and Development (UN-CCESD).

Central Africa

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  • Livelihood and food insecurity intensify competition over natural resources, contributing to violent conflict and insecurity: In Central Africa, the agricultural sector and pastoralism are the main sources of income. Livelihood losses can quickly result in food insecurity, which is known to be both a consequence and a cause of conflict. While tensions within and between groups, because of the effects of climate change on the availability of and access to natural resources, typically plays out in a very localised manner, they can quickly escalate. Mining is also a regional livelihood that is linked with climate and that can involve illicit networks, including armed groups for which the mining and/or taxation of mining activities is an important financing source.
  • Climate impacts exacerbate the proliferation of armed and criminal groups: Climate change has compounded core drivers of conflict and strengthened the ability of armed groups’ efforts to recruit, retain and re-recruit people, especially youth. Herders may either protect themselves or seek protection from armed groups, and the latter gain economic profits from the cattle trade. The spread of firearms amongst transhumant pastoralist and their alleged involvement in arms trafficking is further driving intercommunal hostility. Environmental degradation is one of the main drivers of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, as well as overfishing and maritime crime such as arms and drugs trafficking, human trafficking, piracy and armed robbery at sea.
  • Climate impacts exacerbate challenges around human mobility, contributing to increased conflict and security risks: When climate and environmental pressures increase, refugees, internally displaced persons and host communities suffer from the consequences, especially when natural resources are scarce. Competition can then escalate into conflicts around access to livelihoods, natural resources, aid and development resources. With increased climatic pressures, fertile land has become extremely scarce, resulting into conflicts between local farmers, sedentary agro-pastoralists and transhumant pastoralists.
  • Conflict intensifies environmental degradation: Conflict causes environmental degradation in different ways: pollution of air, water and soil, as well as deliberate environmental destruction and the use of resources as weapons of conflict. These dynamics threaten ecosystems like the Lake Chad Basin and the Congo Basin, which are both of critical importance for livelihoods. The latter is one of the last remaining net carbon sinks in the world, but the impact of climate change combined with direct, human- made environmental pressures damage its ability to absorb CO2. Another growing climate security challenge is human-wildlife conflicts in both savanna and forest ecosystems because of climate change and human-made environmental stressors.

Key Regional Responses:
  • Cross-border agreements: Regional organisation such as the ECCAS and the Central African Forest Commission (COMIFAC) or the Network of Central African Protected Areas (RAPAC) facilitate promising developments.
  • Strengthening social cohesion between pastoralists and farmers, and between pastoral communities: Local and traditional committees benefit from support to prevent conflicts and promote peace by mediating natural resource management, facilitate local justice mechanisms to address grievances and manage conflicts, and foster intercommunal dialogue, with the objective to improve perceptions and change attitudes and behaviours between farmers and herders.
  • Blended finance to support joint peacebuilding and conservation interventions that target drivers of conflict and instability: Support provided to deploy a new force of rangers and ecoguards and a REDD+ strategy aimed at reducing drivers of deforestation, accessing carbon market, providing alternative livelihood models that bring co-benefits to the communities, and fostering durable conservation and peace.
  • Conservation efforts can integrate climate adaptation and peacebuilding objectives at the local level: Various initiatives foster alternative income opportunities (agroforestry and beekeeping) for local and indigenous communities, support community welfare and livelihoods, implement inclusive management principles, provide job opportunities, regulate multi-use areas in protected areas, and empower local communities to engage in Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) of conservation efforts.

Eastern Africa

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  • Competition over natural resources: Competition over natural resources, particularly over water, land, and forests, can arise from both resource scarcity and abundance, and is driven by various factors, along with climate-related impacts. Pastoralism is a major factor behind many communal resource-related conflicts. The most prevalent form of these conflicts is not conflicts between farmers and pastoralists but cattle rustling which has turned violent due to the proliferation of small arms and weapons and can be tied to transnational organised criminal networks, particularly in border areas.
  • Livelihood and food insecurity: Agriculture, pastoralism, and fisheries play a central role in the livelihoods and food security. They are dependent on climate-sensitive resources such as water. For example, excessive rainfall has led to a spike in incidence of livestock diseases. For lake fisheries, reduced precipitation can have negative consequences on the habitat of freshwater species. There are also gender implications as women are more dependent on small-scale agriculture and livestock production. Conversely, the infrastructural damages and livelihood disruptions caused by protracted conflicts also impede access of vulnerable groups to essential services and markets, hereby weakening agricultural and livestock-dependent livelihoods.
  • Maritime fisheries and security: Coastal and island communities are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change: slow and rapid onset events such as sea level rise and cyclone sand storm surges can cause loss of life and widespread damage to infrastructure, thereby affecting livelihood and food security, and causing significant economic losses, coastal flooding and erosion threaten the region’s rich diversity of sea grasses, weakening the natural protection of coastal areas, leading to higher flood risks, warmer sea surface temperatures and ocean acidification affect the health of the coral reefs, challenging the livelihoods and food security of coastal and island communities.
  • Changing mobility patterns: Climate change can make the availability of water and grazing resources less reliable and predictable, causing pastoralists to change grazing routes which could amplify clashes with other pastoralists and farmers. Climate-induced migration of inland communities to coastal areas could increase competition over limited fish stocks. Droughts can also drive populations to areas with more favourable conditions for agriculture, leading to competition over cultivable land between migrant and resident populations. Climate change impacts will likely feed into the trend of rural-urban migration, which could create additional insecurity in urban areas. Increasingly difficult conditions at home may even push more people to pursue irregular forms of migration. Conversely, the securitisation of borders hinders mobility and thus threatens the livelihoods of borderland communities that are dependent on pastoralism and cross-border trade. Such trends disproportionately expose youths to the risks that may occur on route or at the destination, while leaving a disproportionate number of dependents to face livelihood risks at home.
  • Exploitation by armed groups: Prevailing climatic and environmental conditions can hinder or ease the operations of Armed Groups, as well as on the existence and lucrativeness of economic activities that provide them with financial support. While recruitment into armed groups is a complex phenomenon that is driven by a range of factors including identity, religion, social and political marginalisation, it is also happening against the backdrop of the impacts of climate change in worsening livelihood conditions and reducing income. This is especially the case for young pastoralists and in refugee camps, particularly those located in border areas.

Key Regional Responses
  • Strong international cooperation on matters related to climate change and security: The UN Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) stands out as one of the world’s first climate- sensitive political missions and has included in 2020 an environmental and climate security adviser. The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa also have climate and security advisers. The UN Peacebuilding Fund (PBF) has several projects on the climate-conflict nexus. Finally, the World Food Programme's R4 Rural Resilience Initiative uses risk management strategies to promote sustainable farming practices and resilience among the poorest farmers.
  • Proactive regional cooperation to address the Climate Change, Peace and Security Nexus: Several institutions, strategies and mechanisms, such as IGAD’s 3 specialized institutions, its Climate Security Coordination Mechanism and its Regional Climate Change Strategy and Action Plan for 2023-2030 clearly demonstrate a drive to assess climate, peace and security-related risks. The ‘Kampala Ministerial Declaration on Migration, Environment and Climate Change’ calls for countries to work together to address the risks associated with climate-induced migration. EAC has two semi-autonomous institutions that have made headways in fostering cooperation on resource management. The Horn of Africa’s initiative partly focuses on building resilience to climate change impacts in the region’s borderland areas. CGIAR has projects and tools focusing on the links between climate and security, including the Climate Security Observatory and a Climate Security Sensitiveness Scoring Tool (CSST).
  • Gender inclusivity: Efforts have been made in the region for the inclusion of women in peacebuilding and decision-making, recognising the security issues faced by women, including those related to climate change, gender-based violence, and access to justice.
  • Climate-sensitive livelihoods: There is a strong degree of integration of climate resilience- building strategies in policies pertaining to the blue economy for small island states where marine and coastal resources are the backbone of their livelihoods.
  • Climate-conflict sensitivity: Efforts have been made to embed aspects of livelihood resilience and grassroots engagement in responses to conflict and security issues including through a number of policies on climate, environment, and food security that understand climate-related security risks and conditions under which such risks emerge.
  • Human health: National level climate policies in East Africa are increasingly recognising the importance of human health considerations in addressing climate-related impacts.
  • The important contributions of Civil Society Organisations: Formal and informal networks of CSOs are supporting early warning and early response systems. In some cases, CSOs are an integral part of conflict early warning and response strategies. They also play important roles in natural resource management in East Africa.
  • The key influence of traditional authorities and local cultural norms in how potential conflicts are mitigated or addressed: Local conflict resolution mechanisms have reduced the risk of inter-group violence as local cultural norms influence how potential conflicts are mitigated or addressed. They have been incorporated with tangible results in several peacebuilding initiatives in the region. Furthermore, indigenous customs are instrumental in conserving natural resources such as forests.
  • The private sector has been a major strength in terms of climate adaptation: The Private Sector is providing adaptive climate services such as agricultural extension services and livestock insurances reaching, in some cases, more farmers than formal providers.

Southern Africa

Key Climate-Risk Pathways:
  • More frequent weather induced disasters compound root causes of instability: Extreme- weather events, whose frequency is increasing due to climate change, together with other factors such as high international fuel prices, and macroeconomic instability, are affecting food security in the region and can drive instability and social unrest, particularly in communities highly dependent on agricultural livelihoods. Furthermore, disasters strain state services, hinder development, and worsen health conditions.
  • Climate risks and conflict impact human mobility: Mobility, particularly from rural to urban areas, is increasingly serving as a climate adaptation strategy. Extreme-weather events and violence are displacing populations temporary and permanently, increasing competition over livelihoods and natural resources. In addition, when people leave rural areas, there is a decrease in agricultural labour and knowledge, resulting in negative impacts on food security.
  • Land and water access and use conflicts: Climate impacts put pressure on land, leading to encroachment, displacement, and unsustainable practices. Furthermore, water disputes are rising, including between upstream and downstream farmers, due in part to the increasing frequency and severity of droughts. There is also a surge in conflicts between humans and wildlife as animals have been forced to migrate closer to human settlements due to the lack of grazing land and water sources.
  • Weak governance of high-value natural resources: While the green transition offers a lot of opportunities, there are also risks. First, a more significant demand for critical minerals can increase conflicts around mining, and second, the transition can bring loss of revenue to countries dependent on extractive industries and in particular those that rely on fossil fuels, resulting in job losses, social tensions, and stranded assets.

Key Regional Responses:
  • Strengthened Early Warning Systems: The SADC Regional Early Warning Centre (REWC) for conflict prevention, management and resolution focuses mainly on conflict-related data but is beginning to incorporate information on climate-related factors and collaborating with units focused on reducing disaster risks.
  • Leveraging Resilience and DRR Regional Policies: The SADC Regional Resilience Framework 2020-2030 takes an integrated approach to sustainable development, disaster risk reduction, and climate change adaptation. Promising examples of early warning systems include the Southern African Regional Climate Outlook Forum (SARCOF), the SADC Regional Vulnerability Assessment and Analysis (RVAA) Programme and the SADC Disaster Risk Management and Information System (DRM IMS).
  • Well-developed Regional Water Management: The Regional Strategic Action Plan for Integrated Water Resources Development and Management (RSAP-IWRM) showcase awareness of the potential dangers of water issues and have therefore initiated. Several bilateral and multilateral institutions, including river basin organizations (RBOs) have also been established to foster cooperation among shared river courses.
  • Renewable Energy Transition: There are positive examples of mobilisation of international finance to support decarbonization efforts while creating opportunities for workers and communities and providing a blueprint for a just energy transition.
  • Addressing Internal Displacement Caused by Climate Hazards and Conflict: Efforts have been made to identify and implement policies and strategies aiming to reduce the impact of disasters and conflict on the population and the number of displaced people by improving aid support and coordination. Tangible experiences have shown that the early warning strategy and relocation of communities prevented a significant death toll.
  • Integrated Water Management and Nature-Based Solutions: Efforts have been made in the region to restore degraded watersheds through emergency rehabilitation measures, nature-based solutions and implementing catchment management plans and thus talking unsustainable land use patterns and water conflicts, promoting climate resilience, and offering livelihood opportunities for local communities.
  • Localised climate security assessments: There have been cases in the region of local stakeholders co-designing an approach and mapping stakeholders, hazards, climate security risks and solutions for local climate security assessments. This inclusive approach facilitates the collection of relevant information from various sources.
  • Community-Based Natural Resource Management: Some approaches have been piloted in the region to combine traditional and scientific methods as well as reintroduce traditional governance and management systems for pastoral resources and have gained support from traditional leaders.

Existing Initiatives

Deliver as One.

2018
Africa is leading in institutional innovations and cross-sectoral cooperation to address climate-related security risks through its initiatives:
  • Climate Security Cluster
There are major ongoing collaborative efforts between African regional organisations and the AU, African Climate Commissions, the UN system, government agencies, and civil society.
  • UNCSM – (DPPA, UNDP, UNEP, DPO) the CSM seeksto help the UN system address climate-related security risks more systematically.
2022
  • COP 27 – CRSP Initiative
2023
  • COP 28 – Declaration on Climate, Peace, Relief and Recovery
  • Bamako Declaration on Climate Security

Common African Position Roadmap

  • 03.23 – 10.23
    ACRA and Report of the Chairperson
  • Common African Position (CAP) on the Climate, Peace, and Security (CPS) Nexus: Methodology and commencement of drafting.
  • Collaborative Mechanism: Climate Security Cluster
  • Regional Consultations: Regional Consultations with Zero Draft of the CAP-CPS in the 5 AU regions.
  • PSC Experts Consultation: Consultation with Experts of the PSC.
  • Climate Bodies Consultation: Consultation with CAHOSCC, AMCEN and AGN
  • 1. PSC Presentation
    2. COP 29 CAP Launch
    3. Assembly Decision
    4. Strategy and Action Plan

    • Footprint of Success

    The undeniable linkages between climate, peace and security and its implications on stability, primarily as it manifests in Africa, has continued to be a thematic engagement within the AUPSC. Since 2018, the PSC has spearheaded deliberations addressing the security implications of the nexus between climate change and conflicts in Africa, including during its 774th meeting of May 2018. Subsequent to its meetings, Council underscored the importance for the AU Commission to mainstream climate change in all its activities, particularly in early warning and prevention of violent conflicts.

    2021 Footprint of Success

    • In 2021, the PSC dedicated three sessions to the theme . In March 2021, under the Presidency of Kenya, at the Heads of States and Government's level, a session exploring "Sustainable Peace in Africa: Climate Change and its Effects on Peace and Security on the Continent" was held.
    • Two additional sessions in October and November were also dedicated to "Addressing Disaster Management issues in Africa: Challenges and Perspectives for Human Security" and "Climate Change and Peace and Security: The need for an Informed Climate-Security-Development nexus for Africa" respectively.
    • Through these sessions, the PSC underscored the multiple pathways through which climate-related changes interact with the political, social and environmental stresses to compound existing vulnerabilities and tensions.
    • The Council noted that responding to the needs of communities -- particularly to adapting to changing climatic conditions while maintaining their livelihoods, basic needs and security -- is a high priority climate response that is underfunded both within the climate sphere and the peace and security sphere.
    • It therefore, called on the Commission to develop a Common African Position (CAP) on the nexus between Climate, Peace and Security to create a common understanding of the causal linkage between climate and conflict, in particular on Climate Finance and operationalization of the Global Goal on Adaptation, as Africa embarks on hosting COP27 in Egypt and explore tools available to support member states in preventing, mitigating and responding to the risks posed by climate change.
    • The Council also requested the AU Commission to expedite the finalization of a climate-related security risks assessment study, in consultation with Member States; and also underscored the importance of strengthening the capacities of the AU and its Member States, including through capacity building, training, and research activities.
    2022
    • Climate change undermines human security and further exacerbates the factors that affects national security. It is within this context that PAPS, based on mandates given by the AU PSC and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, initiated measures to develop a common African position on the nexus between climate change, peace and security to deepen knowledge and understanding of the linkages between the impact of climate change, on peace and security.
    • Key Messages were generated and presented to the AU PSC on 2 November 2022, and at COP 27 on 8 November 2022 . The Department also initiated a process to review the early warning indicators and mainstream climate change factors for information gathering and data analysis towards effective preventive measures and responses.
    2023
    • The Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace, and Security unveiled the African Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA) Report at COP 28 in Dubai on December 8, 2023.
    • The Side Event was held by DPAPS in collaboration with the AU Department for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), Adelphi think tank, and the Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding (CCCPA).
    • This was the first time the PSC participated in a side-event of a United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conference of Parties (COP).
    • The Chair and members of the PSC from the Gambia, Congo Brazzaville, Djibouti, and Zimbabwe graced the occasion, along with a representative of the Chair of the African Group of Negotiators (AGN), representatives of some AU Member States, RECs, the UN, partners and members of CSOS.
    • The ACRA report highlights the nexus between climate change, peace, and security in Africa, in which climate change impacts, through floods, drought, storms and other climate stressors or hazards, undermine human security and exacerbate conflicts.
    • It conceptualised climate change impacts through the lens of peace and security, emphasizing linkages and emerging pathways that heighten vulnerabilities.
    • These were reflected in an African regional climate security profile, clearly demonstrating forced displacement, mobility, migration, fertile grounds for activities of armed groups, and the exacerbation of conflicts in the five regions of the continent.
    • These have brought about food, water, energy and health risks with dire consequences on livelihoods.
    • Key findings of the study included the shrinking of the Lake Chad basin, continent-wide water security risks, and the Sahel-Sudanian bio-climatic zone increased agro-pastoralist conflicts.
    • Also worth noting are the intensified activities of armed and terrorist groups in climate change-affected areas, and submerging coastlines of African Island States.
    • Misunderstanding and lack of in-depth knowledge about the climate, peace and security nexus, in addition to the weak interface between early warning and early action climate-security mechanisms, have undermined climate-security responses.
    • This is also compounded by the siloed approach to or lack of integrated responses to the problem, particularly in post-conflict reconstruction and development or peacebuilding contexts, and the climate finance dilemma.
    • The exclusion of indigenous climate-security institutions in adaptation, resilience and mitigation efforts has not helped in the climate action, while seeking African solutions to the problem.
    • The recent Declaration on Relief, Recovery and Peace at the COP 28, by state and non-state actors, remain instructive in bringing to the fore the urgent attention to the climate, peace and security dynamics, requiring integrated, catalytic responses in affected-communities, with a focus on vulnerable groups.
    • The ACRA Report served as the basis for drafting the AUC Chairperson's Report on the Study of the Nexus between Climate Change, Peace, and Security. These reports, along with the 15 Key Messages on the Common African Position (CAP) on Climate Change, Peace, and Security, will inform the development of the CAP on the nexus. DPAPS, in collaboration with the ARBE and partners, will develop the CAP for consideration and possible adoption by the June/July 2024 AU Summit, and for presentation at COP 29.
    • The CAP seeks to provide a unified stance on climate security for AGN negotiations, supported by the recently adopted Declaration on Relief, Recovery, and Peace at COP 28. This will also further guide the development of a climate, peace and security strategy to mainstream climate change and adaptation to promote peace in Africa.
    • Prominent among regional cooperation programmes on the nexus between climate change, peace and security is the "International Ministerial Conference on Transhumance on the nexus: transhumance, protected areas and natural resources, development, peace and security" that brings together Ministers for Defense, Ministers for Forests and Protected Areas and Ministers for the Environment and Livestock of about ten countries, as well as representatives of some sub-regional and regional institutions.
    • It is expected that the Final Communiqué of the second edition of the "International Ministerial Conference on Transhumance on the nexus: transhumance, protected areas and natural resources, development, peace and security", which took place in Yaoundé, Cameroon, from 10-12 July 2023, under the patronage of H.E. Paul BIYA, President of the Republic of Cameroon, would deepen understanding on how climate change is influencing transhumance challenges and threatening peace and security as well as cross-border cooperation in different parts of Africa, particularly in the Lake Chad basin Countries, the DRC, the CAR, Sudan, South Sudan etc.
    2024
    • 355. In May 2018, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU-PSC) directed the AU Commission to embark on a critical study on the nexus between climate change, peace, and security in Africa. The AU Assembly's 35th and 37th Ordinary Sessions further reinforced this call in February 2022 and 2024. These sessions reiterated the urgency of finalizing the climate-related security risk assessment and developing a comprehensive Common African Position on Climate, Peace, and Security (CAP- CPS).
    • 356. In March 2024, the Chairperson of the AU submitted a comprehensive report to the PSC, outlining the challenges and providing concrete recommendations for addressing climate-induced conflict in Africa. The report highlighted the importance of key stakeholders such as the AU Assembly Committee on Climate Change (CAHOSCC), RECs/RMs, and AU-wide bodies. It emphasized enhancing governance by strengthening climate-security capacities, ensuring inclusivity, and focusing on marginalized groups.
    • 357. The report also called for developing knowledge through building capacities and improving early warning systems, building civil society capacities, leveraging local knowledge, and involving the private sector in resilience efforts. Also, the report underlined the need to mobilize finance, close the adaptation financing gap, and ensure a just transition to meet Africa’s unique challenges.
    • 358. The AU has since identified 15 key messages on the Climate Change, Peace, and Security Nexus, which were presented at COP 27 in Sharm el Sheikh, Egypt in 2022. These messages highlight the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on peace and security, advocating for a peaceful and stable continent to facilitate effective preventive, adaptation, and mitigation efforts. Key areas of focus include national ownership, coordinated approaches, climate financing, early warning systems, and addressing climate-induced displacement and migration.
    • 359. The key messages underscored that climate change security risks adversely affect vulnerable groups such as women, children, and refugees in Africa. Assessments and security profiles are needed within regional mechanisms to aid effective responses. Strengthened early warning systems are crucial for disaster risk reduction and adaptation. Just transition pathways are essential for growth and development, and failure to address climate change can exacerbate vulnerabilities.
    • 360. In August 2024, a Member-State Consultation in Nairobi convened over 100 experts from various sectors to deliberate on the Common African Position on Climate Peace and Security (CAP-CPS). This collaborative effort between the AU Department of Political Affairs and Peace and Security (DPAPS), the AU Department of Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy, and Sustainable Environment (DARBE), congregated leading actors including the African Group of Negotiators, Cairo International Centre for Conflict Resolution, Peacekeeping, and Peacebuilding in Africa (CCCPA), supported by international partners namely; Germany through GIZ and Adelphi, United Kingdom, Republic of Ireland, and the UNOAU. Its focus was on the overall thrust of the CAP-CPS.
    • 361. With the invaluable support of African institutions and partners, these efforts resulted in the Africa Climate Security Risk Assessment (ACRA) Report. Although the Assessment did not receive full support of all Member States, it facilitated in-depth deliberation on the priorities and challenges faced by Member States. This process led to the development of eleven (11) principles and identified nine (9) key priorities and eleven (11) challenges as the Nairobi Outcome. The Nairobi Outcome offers crucial preliminary principles that should contribute to the development of the CAP- CPS.
    • 362. On 17 October 2024, the AUPSC and the UNSC explored collaboration on integrating climate-related security risks into peacebuilding efforts. The two Councils focused on developing joint frameworks, investing in capacity building and training, and engaging local communities in decision-making processes, as well as early warning systems, joint analysis, and planning sessions to better anticipate climate risks and strengthen stability. This collaboration seeks to ensure coherent and effective responses to climate-related security risks, aligning both AU PSC and UNSC climate, peace, and security decisions.
    • 363. The AUPSC Communique of 30 October 2024, emphasized the need for strengthened cross-sectoral coordination among actors working on climate, peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian issues. It calls for the Common African Position (CAP) as an informed framework for collaboration. Climate change responses should be conflict-sensitive and security-sensitive, addressing interlinkages between climate change and human mobility. It also highlighted the importance of prioritizing water and food security, sustainable cross-border transhumance, and holistic responses to climate impacts, including sea-level rise and desertification.
    • 364. The AU Commission participated at the COP29 in Baku, Azerbaijan, in November 2024. In collaboration with the Aswan Forum for Sustainable Peace and Development, the Political Affairs Peace and Security Department, on 15 November 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, held a high-level Panel on: “Africa and the Climate, Peace, and Security Nexus: Towards a Common African Position.,” on the margins of the COP29. The meeting took stock of progress made towards forging a Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace, and Security and charted a pathway towards launching it in 2025. The event was attended by high-level officials from African governments, Members of the AU PSC, African stakeholders, and development partners
    2025

    f) Climate Change, Peace and Security (2025)



    • 316. Climate change has continued to evolve as a significant risk multiplier affecting peace, security, and stability in parts of the continent. In many contexts, these climate- related pressures have intensified competition over land and water resources, and contributed to insecurity, accelerated displacement, and compounded the operational environment for conflict, violent extremism, and humanitarian crises. The Assembly, at its 35th Ordinary Session held in February 2022, adopted Decision 815, acknowledging the inextricable link between climate change, peace and security. This political direction was further reinforced through the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022–2032). In addition, at its 1240th meeting in October 2024, the Peace and Security Council underscored the need for a Common African Position on Climate Change, Peace and Security (CAP- CPS) as a unifying continental framework, and called for enhanced cross-sectoral coordination, strengthened Member State ownership, and greater alignment with partners.
    • 317. In 2025, the African Union Commission, under the guidance of the Peace and Security Council, intensified efforts to finalise the CAP-CPS. At its 1263rd meeting in March 2025, the Council explicitly called for the finalisation of the CAP-CPS, reaffirming its strategic importance as a continental priority. To this end, a technical write-shop was convened in Nairobi in July 2025 to consolidate inputs from previous consultations and refine the draft into a coherent, implementable framework. The draft CAP-CPS was subsequently shared with key stakeholders, including the African Group of Negotiators (AGN).

    f) Climate Change, Peace and Security (2025) continued



    • 318. In November 2025, AU Member States and stakeholders convened in Nairobi for a Member States Validation Workshop on the draft CAP-CPS. Member States reaffirmed that climate change constitutes one of the risk multiplier and underscored the urgency of developing an African-owned, evidence-based, and politically coherent position that reflects the continent's lived realities, priorities, and aspirations. While welcoming the extensive work undertaken by the Commission, Member States emphasised the need for more precise conceptual framing, more substantial alignment with national and regional contexts, and enhanced coherence with existing continental frameworks and processes. Notably, Member States agreed that the process should remain consultative and iterative, noting that further refinement of the draft was required prior to formal validation. To this end, a clear roadmap was agreed upon, comprising the Commission's revision of the draft, structured circulation to Member States for capital-level input, recirculation following the incorporation of comments, and the convening of a final validation workshop ahead of submission to the Peace and Security Council. Member States reaffirmed their collective commitment to ensuring that the CAP-CPS emerges as a credible, truly African position capable of strengthening the continent's agency, resilience, and coherence in responding to escalating climate-related peace and security risks.
    • 319. In September 2025, the 2nd Africa Climate Summit was held in Addis Ababa, which culminated with the adoption of the Addis Ababa Climate Declaration, highlighting the nexus between climate, peace and security.


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    PARTNERSHIP FOOTPRINT OF SUCCESS

    No one institution is capable of meeting all the continent's governance, peace and security needs. The progress made so far has been possible through joint efforts between the Commission, the RECs and RMs, Member States, multilateral and bilateral Partners and international, continental and national civil society organisations. Our ability to effectively and efficiently deliver on our mandate is dependent on deepening our strategic partnerships, understanding the strengths and limitations of each Partner and maximising the opportunities each presents.
    Smart partnership and cooperation to enhance global governance, peace and security organisations
    In our new business model, co-creation is the hallmark of our partnerships. At the multilateral level, technocrats in the Department are working with their counterparts in other organisations, particularly the UN, in setting up joint task teams on critical elements in governance, peace and security. These joint task teams allow for collaborative analysis, horizon scanning and scenario development to guide decision makers in their organisations.

    To harness the opportunities provided by the continental free trade regime to promote peace, security and stability, we collaborated with the Department of Economic Development, Tourism, Trade, Industry and Mining, and other multilateral organisations, to organise a continental policy conference on Promoting the Peace, Security, and Development Nexus: The Promise of Regional Integration. The outcome of the policy conference offers concrete recommendations for promoting inclusive growth and development to minimise inequalities that could be mobilised to foment insecurity and proactively use the opportunities of Africa's free trade regime to promote peace and security.

    "In our new business model, co-creation is the hallmark of our partnerships"

    As part of our determination to use evidence­ based knowledge for policy development and implementation, we have instituted formal structures of engagement with African civil society organisations. The idea is to provide a platform to strategically interact and use civil society expertise to generate evidence­ based policy-oriented research to guide the Department's work, thereby ensuring use of the various studies being conducted.


    2021

    2021

    United Nations


    • Significant progress has been recorded in the implementation of the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security of April 2017 despite increasing threats to peace, security and good governance on the Continent amid the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes sustained policy dialogue, horizon scanning and clustered meeting, joint high-level missions, coordinated messaging including during electoral processes, and country-level coordinated action.
    • The 18th Joint Task Force in peace and security was held on 5 November 2021. The PAPS Commissioner and the UN Under Secretary Generals for the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; Peace Operations as well as Operational Supports respectively (DPPA, DPO and DOS) discussed peace and security challenges on the Continent. Joint technical-level conflict prevention cluster meetings also held virtually with increased frequency in 2021 on country-specific situations, including in Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Sudan, Mozambique, eSwatini as well as on elections.
    • The Commissioner for PAPS and the UN USG-DPO undertook a joint mission to CAR in June 2021 , in collaboration with ECCAS and the EU. The AU and UN have also worked closely with regional organizations such as IGAD in Ethiopia, Sudan, South Sudan and Somalia. They also worked with ECOWAS for unified messaging on the situations in Mali and Guinea and are closely engaging in the Libya peace process. The Commission and the OSE-WPS collaborated with the UN to organize the annual Africa Women's Leadership Network (AWLN) Third Women Leaders Forum.
    • Through the joint project between AUC and UNDP on enhancing AU's capacities on Conflict Prevention , several programmes were implemented in line with the Project Initiation Plan (PIP). This include the CSVRA/CSVMS processes in the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, Zambia and Ghana, with ongoing efforts to ensure sustained support for the implementation of the mitigation strategies as well as operationalization of peace architectures in Member States; capacities of CSOs in Eastern and Southern African regions were also enhanced on early warning; as well as the conduct of a training of trainers course by the Youth4Peace programme on "Art, Culture and Heritage" for peace, leveraging the AU theme of the year 2021.
    • The Commission also collaborated with the UN to develop its strategic documents such as policy guidelines, monitoring and reporting and accountability mechanisms for the Maputo Five-Year Work plan to operationalize the ASF. In collaboration with the RECs/RMs, as well as the African Peacekeeping Training Centres of Excellence (TCEs), the AU and UN enhance capacities of RECs' planning and management of peace operations as well as supported the operationalisation of the Continental Logistics Concept and Continental Movements Control Centre.
    • Collaboration between both institutions also facilitated the development of the training curriculum on gender mainstreaming for PSOs, the revision and harmonisation of the gender training package for AU PSOs; and the production of "She Stands for Peace" Podcast series on different thematic issues of the WPS agenda. In addition, the two organisations have worked together in the implementation of the Gender, WPS agenda, implementation of the AU Compliance Framework on the Conduct and Discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse; and the finalization of the AU Board of Inquiry policy for AMISOM.
    • Furthermore, the AUC Department of PAPS and the UN developed the AU Safety and Security Policy and Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for AUC staff and installations in the field missions, as well as the AU policy on the management of recovered weapons in PSOs. Under the DOS Knowledge Experience Exchange Program (KEEP), the AU has been allocated licenses to access the Supply Chain schoolhouse, training facilities and opportunities. Medical support to AMISOM troops, including personal protective equipment and COVID-19 vaccines were enhanced.

    2021

    The European Union


    • The strategic partnership between the AU and EU continued to bolster and benefited from the guidance of the 2018 MoU on Peace, Security and Governance. Within the implementation of this MoU, key notable achievements were recorded. The political dialogue between the two institutions increased in frequency, scope and depth. In 2021, the Ministerial Meeting in Kigali among other things reaffirmed the need to reinforce the cooperation and work towards the effective delivery of the MoU. Furthermore, the Commissioner for PAPS engaged with EU counterparts on the strategic priorities to strengthen key partnership issues in the peace and security arena especially continuous EU support to AMISOM especially in the post-2021 period.
    • Despite the decade of flourishing engagement between the EU and the AU, concerns have been raised about the dissolution of the African Peace Facility (APF) and the creation of the European Peace Facility (EPF). The global nature of the EPF funding mechanism implies enhanced competition for resources which could potentially diminish support to the AU. Furthermore, the political role of the AU in disbursing funds from the APF to the RECs/RMs and Member States has been removed in the EPF structure; thereby allowing the EU to fund African Member States and RECs/RMs directly without consulting the AU.
    • These concerns were raised in Kigali and during the Commissioner's engagement with EU counterparts. The AU continues to call on the EU to reconsider the political nature of the EPF disbursement and to uphold the principle of responsive partnership. Looking ahead, the AU-EU Summit on 18 to 19 February 2022 is an opportunity to re-engage on these issues while strengthening the partnership.
    2022

    2022

    Partnerships for Peace


    • Several activities were implemented to strengthen the AU's partnership with multilateral regional and subregional organisation on peace and security. Through sustained policy dialogue, joint high-level missions, coordinated messaging and country-level coordinated actions, for instance, significant progress was recorded in the implementation of the Joint UN-AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security. Further, in the context of AU-UN Partnership, there were regular engagements between the President of the UNSC and the Chair of the AUPSC between the AUPSC and UNSC on region-specific, as well as thematic issues.
    • Recognizing the challenge that political instability poses to sustainable development, the AU Commission was supported and joined by the UN and partners in organizing a Reflection Forum on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa, in March 2022 in Accra, Ghana. The outcome of the Forum fed into the Malabo Declaration on Terrorism, and Unconstitutional Changes of Government adopted by the 16th Extraordinary Session of the AU Assembly held on 28 May 2022, in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea as well as the adoption of the Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa.

    2022

    Partnership for Peace


    • In partnership with the UNDP, the PAPS department established the African Facility to Support Inclusive Transitions (AFSIT) during the year under review. AFSIT will support countries going through complex political transitions to peacefully navigate their pathway back to more stable democratic development, with a specific focus on ensuring the inclusion of women, young people and other marginalized groups. AUC and UNDP worked to operationalize the AFSIT and, guided by the Accra Declaration and various PSC directives, articulate the specific scope, structure, programmatic interventions, and criteria for supporting transitions.
    • The AUC-PAPS and ETIM, in partnership with UNDP, UNECA, African Development Bank and Afrexim Bank, the convened the inaugural AUC Policy Conference on Promoting the Peace, Security and Development Nexus in Africa, from 25 to 27 October 2022 in Tangier, Kingdom of Morocco. The Policy Conference allowed the AUC and its partners to reflect on measures and strategies to promote development, regional integration, and peace and security. The Conference adopted the Tangier Declaration. The joint organization of the Policy Conference demonstrated strong partnership between the AUC and development partners.
    2023

    2023

    Strengthening Partnerships for African Peace and Security


    • Milestones
      • The PSC and the European Union Political and Security Committee (EUPSC) held their 6th Informal Joint Seminar and the 14th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting (AJCM) and the from 2-3 May 2023, respectively, in Brussels, Belgium, to exchange views on their joint efforts to address the threats to peace and security in Africa. The Informal Joint Seminar discussed peace support operations in Africa and the global consequences of geopolitical development, while the Consultative meeting discussed the situations in the Horn of Africa, The Sahel and Lake Chad Basin and the Great Lakes Region. However, the PSC with the EUPSC did not reach commonly agreed conclusions for the second time.
      • Article 17 of the PSC Protocol provides for the PSC to cooperate and work closely with the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and other relevant international organizations on the issues of governance, peace and security in Africa. In this context, the PSC and the UN Security Council convened their 8th Informal Joint Seminar and 17th Annual Joint Consultative Meeting (AJCM) on 5 and 6 October 2023 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, and adopted a Joint Communique. The Informal Joint Seminar discussed, among others, the issue of financing AU Peace Support Operations and the Consultative Meeting discussed the situations in Sudan, the Sahel region, the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Somalia, as well as the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS). While underscoring the primary responsibility of the UN Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security, the two Councils reaffirmed their unwavering commitment to working together to address the challenges in these theatres in a coordinated manner.
      • Underscoring the importance of post-conflict and reconstruction activities in Member States emerging from conflict, the PSC convened a consultative meeting with the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UN-PBC) on 13 November 2023 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The session focused on enhancing collaboration between the two bodies and coordinating peacebuilding efforts on the continent.

    2023 (continued)

    • In December 2023, the PSC and the three elected African Members of the UNSC (A3) participated at the Tenth High-Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa: Assisting Incoming African Members of the United Nations Security Council (A3) in Preparing to Address Peace and Security Issues on the Continent, in Oran, Algeria, pursuant to communiqué [PSC/AHG/COMM/1.(CCCXCVII)], adopted by the PSC at its 397th meeting held at the level of Heads of State and Government on 23 September 2013. Key outcomes centred on enhancing PSC-A3 cooperation in advancing and promoting Africa's agenda and interests in the UNSC agenda.
    • The PSC and A3 commemorated its 10th Anniversary and considered the Manual on Modalities for Enhancing Coordination between the Peace and Security Council of the African Union and the African Members of the United Nations Security Council.
    • The Manual aims at providing guidance on how the PSC and A3 can promote and defend common African positions within the UNSC in accordance with the UN Charter, AU legal instruments and relevant decisions of the AU Policy Organs. The Conclusions of the 10th High Level Seminar on Peace and Security in Africa, the Oran Process, have been adopted by the PSC at its 1193rd meeting of 22 January 2024, and attached herewith as Annex III.
    2024
    Partnerships for Peace, Security and Governance
    429. Inclusive, smart, and mutually beneficial partnerships continue to be the topmost priority for the PAPS Department. To this end, the Department pursues enhanced interconnectivity with all stakeholders and partners toward promoting good governance, peace, and security. Furthermore, the department seeks to continue to engage think tanks, do-tanks, the academia, and CSOs within and outside the continent, towards rethinking and proposing the pragmatic role of women and youth in peace and security as well as on other thematic areas, to make peace happen.
    United Nations
    • 430. Significant progress has been recorded in the implementation of the Joint UN- AU Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security of April 2017 despite increasing threats to peace, security, and good governance on the continent. AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and DPAPS senior staff held a strategic dialogue with UNOAU on 20 February 2024 which reflected on the experiences of the AU-UN partnership in peace and security in 2023 and the priorities for 2024.
    • 431. The 23rd Joint Task Force of USGs and CPAPS consulted at the UN Headquarters on 16 April 2024, comprising the AU Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security and the UN Under Secretaries General for Political & Peace Building Affairs; Peace Operations and the Special Representative of the Secretary- General to the African Union; along with the Assistant Secretaries-General (Africa) and Operational Support.
    • 432. The consultative platform examined the peace and security developments in the CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Libya, Mozambique, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan, as well as West Africa and the Sahel region. It also considered the way forward, following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023). A senior-level Joint Task Force was established to coordinate the efforts of the Secretariat and its engagement with the AU towards the implementation of UNSCR 2719.
    • 433. The Joint Working Group on PSOs and Ad-hoc Security Initiatives continued interaction and coordination throughout the year. The AUC and the UN Secretariat maintained technical-level contacts on regional, country-specific, and thematic files. As part of the revitalization of the AU climate security cluster and the UN climate security mechanism , the first interdepartmental retreat on climate, peace, and security convened on 11 May 2024; the Retreat built on the consultative process conducted as part of the African continental climate security risk assessment, as requested by the AU PSC, as well as collaboration towards the development of the common African position on climate, peace and security. This includes sustained policy dialogue, horizon scanning and clustered meetings, joint high-level missions, coordinated messaging including during electoral processes, and country-level coordinated action.
    • 434. The Commission also collaborated with the UN to develop strategic documents namely; policy guidelines, monitoring and reporting, and accountability mechanisms for the Maputo Five-Year Work plan to operationalize the ASF. In collaboration with the RECs/RMs, and the African Peacekeeping Training Centers of Excellence (TCEs), the AU and UN contributed to enhancing the capacities of RECs/RMs’ planning and management of peace operations and supported the operationalization of the Continental Logistics Concept and Continental Movements Control Centre.
    • 435. AU/UN Partnership also resulted in the development of the training curriculum on gender-mainstreaming for PSOs, the revision and harmonization of the gender training package for AU PSOs; and the production of “She Stands for Peace” Podcast series on different thematic issues of the WPS agenda.
    • 436. In addition, the two organizations worked together in the implementation of the Gender, WPS agenda , and implementation of the AU Compliance Framework on the Conduct and Discipline and Sexual Exploitation and Abuse ; and the finalization of the AU Board of Inquiry policy for ATMIS .
    • 437. The UN and AU continued to hold strategic dialogues , both at Headquarters and in the field, to assess conflict situations, complementarities, and coordination of actions, and explore areas for common messaging. In this regard, the Annual Conference also officially established the High-Level Strategic Dialogue on Sustainable Development, to be chaired by the Deputy Secretary-General and the Deputy Chairperson. The High-level Strategic Dialogue held its 3rd meeting on 29 May 2024, at which they reviewed implementation mechanisms for the operationalization of the five “college-to-college” formations as a new method of working between AU Commissioners and their United Nations counterparts in the context of AU Agenda 2063 and SDGs 2030.
    • 438. On 8 July 2024, the Military Staff Committee of the AUPSC and representatives of the Military Staff Committee of the UN engaged in their first informal consultations at the AU headquarters. This enabled the two Committees to better understand their respective mandates, working methods, and challenges while laying the foundation for more effective collaboration to provide timely and informed advice to the two Councils.
    • 439. On 15 October 2024, the Peacebuilding Commission and the AUPSC scheduled at the UN Headquarters, their seventh annual consultative meeting, which explored the opportunities for enhancing cooperation with a view to supporting the African Union’s PCRD and peace-building efforts.
    • 440. The 18th AUPSC / UNSC Annual Joint Consultation took place on 18 October, in New York, preceded by the 9th Informal Joint Seminar on 17 October 2024. The deliberations considered matters about financing AU-led Peace Support Operations (PSOs), Youth, Peace and Security, and the working methods of the joint meetings and other engagements; as well as the review of the conflict situations in the Sudan, Sahel, Somalia, and eastern DRC.
    • 441. The meetings of the two Councils were preceded by two-day consultations of the AUPSC Committee of Experts and the Security Council’s Ad-hoc Working Group on Peace and Security in Africa, which included comprehensive briefings by the AU Commission.
    • 442. The eighth Annual Conference between the Secretary-General and the AUC Chairperson took place on 21 October 2024. The Secretary-General and Chairperson reviewed progress in the implementation of the “UN-AU Joint Framework for Enhanced Partnership in Peace and Security” and the “AU-UN Framework for the Implementation of Agenda 2063 and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development” and signed the AU-UN Joint Framework on Human Rights. Then discussions covered Unconstitutional changes of government and political transitions on the continent; the coordination of peace efforts in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan) and the Great Lakes region; the progress on Security Council negotiations on predictable financing of the AU-led peace support operations; Africa’s socio-economic recovery and the reform of the international financial architecture. The annual conference also endorsed the jointly developed roadmap for the implementation of UNSCR 2719 (2023) on the financing of AU-led PSOs.
    European Union
    • 443. The strategic partnership between the AU and EU continued to bolster and benefit from the guidance of the 2018 MoU on Peace, Security, and Governance . The formulation of the combined EU support programme for the AGA and APSA is nearing completion. Set to begin in January 2026, the programme is designed to capitalize on the synergies between the AGA and APSA, with a planned duration of four years. Key areas of cooperation include early warning, mediation, climate and security, human rights, and the promotion of good governance and democracy. This integrated programme will enhance human rights adherence in AU-led Peace Support Operations and will place a strong emphasis on increasing citizen participation in governance, peace, and security. Additionally, EU support through the Early Response Mechanism will be redirected to support the initiatives under the Crisis Reserve Facility of the AU Peace Fund.
    • 444. The Joint Financing Arrangement (JFA) has evolved into a non-binding coordination framework, now referred to as the "Joint Framework Arrangement (JFA)." The JFA is designed to strengthen coordination among all stakeholders involved in managing and supporting AU Commission initiatives. This framework encompasses both partners contributing earmarked funding and those providing non-earmarked funding for the Commission 's activities, with the coordination platform now extended to include AUC Member States. The JFA is set to remain in place until December 2028, with Canada, Denmark, the EU, Germany, Ireland, Norway, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom, already committed to it.
    TICAD Ministerial

    • 445. In preparation for the 9th Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) scheduled for August 2025, the PAPS Department participated in the TICAD Ministerial session in Tokyo, Japan, from August 24-25, 2024. This strategic engagement aimed to enhance partnerships and advance Africa's peace and security agenda. The session allowed stakeholders to deepen cooperation, sharpening collective approaches toward ensuring human dignity and security in Africa. While underscoring the imperative for robust Global multilateralism to achieve global security and the Peace we want in Africa, the following key reflections were highlighted (i) the free will of African citizens to build innovative capacity in the advanced age of the knowledge economy and new technologies particularly the youth for assured human security; (ii) Political will to boost democratic leadership In Africa evident In constitutionalism, rule of law, and building of resilient Institutions; (iii) Collective will that Is anchored on smart partnerships to achieve global sustainable security for all.
    • 446. The ministerial presented a platform to reaffirm the importance of prioritizing prevention while working to ensure lasting solutions to pervasive security threats including lingering conflicts, terrorism, and violent extremism by tackling the root causes. Overall, it highlighted the need to strengthen African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and African Governance Architecture (AGA) including support to AU-led peace support operations through UNSC Resolution 2719 (2023), sustainable and predictable financing, and capacity building for public institutions, as appropriate.

    Beijing Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC)



    • 447. In September 2024, President Xi Jinping hosted 34 African leaders to the 2024 Summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) held in Beijing. The AUC Chairperson, ably supported by the CPAPS and other Commissioners were also in attendance. Chinese President Xi announced China's readiness to work with Africa to implement China 's 10 partnership actions carefully crafted to jointly advance modernization in the two (2) continents and the overall characterization of China-Africa relations to be elevated to an all-weather China-Africa community with a shared future for the new era. Within the ten (10) partnership actions for modernization to deepen China-Africa cooperation, the PAPS related areas reflecting China's confidence and sincerity in promoting modernization with Africa are mutual learning among civilizations in state governance; development cooperation; people-to-people exchanges; and common security.

    Building an African

    Narrative Towards

    2063