

**Enhancing Operational Land Border Security Cooperation
in the Sahelo-Saharan Region
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Tripoli, Libya**

Presentation by:

**Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in
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Delivered by:

**Dr Pinglawathie Udit
Head of the Alert and Early Warning Department**

ENHANCING OPERATIONAL LAND BORDER SECURITY
COOPERATION IN THE SAHELO-SAHARAN REGION 4-5
SEPTEMBER 2013
TRIPOLI, LIBYA

**ENHANCING INTERAGENCY COMMUNICATION AND COORDINATION
AND BUILDING REGIONAL COOPERATION AND CAPACITY**

**COMMITTEE OF INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY SERVICES OF
AFRICA(CISSA)**

SCOPE

- Introduction
- Context of collective security
- International and multilateral cooperation and intelligence sharing
 - The United Nations Case
 - The European Union Case
- CISSA: The African Perspective
 - Scope of Cooperation and Sharing
 - Role in Regional Security
- Sharing Institutions and Trust
- Towards Cross-Border Security Cooperation and Integrity
 - Regional Ownership
 - Interdepartmental Cooperation
 - Capacity Building
 - International Coordination and Support

CONTEXT OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

- Instability in Sahelo-Saharan region transcended borders leading to security challenges in North and West Africa
- Serious threats are localised but also take place across national borders
- Countries in region used as meeting places, transit points or even temporary bases to initiate activities
- Transborder regions groups undertake informal border patrols
- Countries in region lack technical capabilities, insufficient cooperation and too few border control centres
- Multiple terrorist groupings involved in range of activities
- Cross border clashes between Tunisia-Libya, Tuaregs of Mali-Algeria
- People fleeing conflict and famine from countries further south use porous borders to Europe
- Cross-border escalation of drugs and weapons contraband

SIGNIFICANT VULNERABILITIES AND CRITICAL THREATS IN REGION

- Long and porous desert frontiers
- Multiple terrorist groupings and foreign fighters involved in TOC
- Borders as crossing points for both large commercial and subsistence smugglers and contraband
- Emergence of multiple militias and their illegal involvement in border control
- Indigenous groups role in unofficial control of territory in different border regions
- Proliferation of Weapons
- Irregular migration flows from SSA to North Africa and into Europe
- Capacity gaps in security sector governance policing, customs, border security
- Communities in border areas possibly facilitate and thwart border security and control

The United Nations Case

- Debate whether US should share intelligence with UN
- Two policy recommendations:
 - certain agencies within UN and other international org must be able to receive sensitive information
 - to use shared intelligence relevant international agencies must be able to assess accuracy, relevance and implications
- Improving ability of collective security institutions to handle intelligence will enhance international cooperation to combat terrorism
- *Transnational organized crime is a serious threat to long-term stabilization and undermines the establishment of functioning legitimate institutions in almost every theatre where there are United Nations peace-keeping operations. Few threat assessments of the political economy of conflict are undertaken. There is resistance to allowing UN field operations to gather intelligence other than by individual peacekeeping contingents for limited force protection and situational awareness purposes.*

The EU Case

- **The Berne Group**, which brings together the security services of all of the Member States
- **Europol**, which collects, shares and disseminates intelligence on threats such as organized crime and terrorism
- **European Union Military Staff** that analyses intelligence on overseas developments
- Technical mechanisms for the diffusion of intelligence between national authorities, including organizing regular meetings of ministers and officials, creating common intelligence databases and sharing information on security issues such as counter-terrorism.

African Perspective

- Provide CISSA Secretariat and each other with intelligence relevant to the prevention, investigation or prosecution of any person engaged in serious transnational organized crimes including terrorism
- Cooperate to safeguard members from the threat of crime, whether domestic, regional or transnational and terrorism
- Facilitate compilation of Regional /Continental Intelligence Estimates (CIE)
- All forms of cooperation, including the pooling of resources and services and the conduct of joint intelligence operations
- CISSA in terms of continental cooperation is constituted of five regions with each region focusing on particularities of threats and challenges of a regional and a sub-regional nature.
- Each member designates a Focal Point of Contact and an alternate for the purposes of cooperation with the Secretariat and Member States who are responsible for facilitating all cooperation and exchange of intelligence activities.

Scope of Cooperation and Sharing

- Members provide CISSA Secretariat and each other with intelligence relevant to the prevention, investigation or prosecution of any person engaged in serious transnational organized crimes including terrorism
- Cooperate to safeguard members from the threat of crime, whether domestic, regional or transnational and terrorism
- Facilitate compilation of Regional /Continental Intelligence Estimates (CIE)
- All forms of cooperation, including the pooling of resources and services and the conduct of joint intelligence operations where necessary, in the interest of peace, stability and development of the continent
- Members utilize the secure communication or other secure channels agreed by all CISSA members
- Members as part of the cooperative relationship, establish procedures for sharing intelligence, both on a routine basis and under special circumstances

Operational Strength

- Platform for engagement, created through long-term investment in confidence-building, the relationships between intelligence practitioners is based on mutual respect and a degree of trust
- Collaboration on sensitive security issues is enhanced
- One major operational challenge when cooperation of intelligence services in those fields where the interests of their respective states coincide
- Cooperation extends to exchange of information, joint analysis and estimate of certain situations and operational support
- Quality and reliability of the piece of intelligence
- Collaboration on open source collection, early warning alerts, strategic assessments, exchange of information, joint analysis and possible operational mission support and capacity building.

Regional Security approach

- Focus is on particular transnational nature of security in Africa
- Focal points facilitate cooperation but operates regionally within framework of state-based system with national interests
- Absence of international gathering capacity states primary actors
- National intelligence to serve national interests that happen to correspond to international security
- CISSA current focus : *provide leadership to further peace, security and stability in the region and continent, facilitate cooperation and interaction on border security intelligence, develop and consolidate confidence building measures and provide the African Union with necessary data*
- Positive contribution is channel of communication between states that may be parties in conflict; confidence building measures and optimise mediation and conflict resolution.
- Collaborative operations to address cross-border security threats such as weapons smuggling through multinational operations
- CISSA, APSA, ASF, POW or any mediation or observer missions can be facilitated by information from national agencies to enable effective planning and deployment.

International Sharing Institutions

- The **Berne Group, or Club of Berne** serves as the principal point of contact of the heads of national security services, who meet regularly under its auspices. However, the Berne Group operates outside of the institutions of the EU
- European Police Organization, or **Europol** priorities are illegal trafficking in drugs, human beings and vehicles; illegal immigration; terrorism; and forgery, money-laundering and cyber crime that cross national borders.
 - objective is to improve the sharing of intelligence on these matters between Member States rather than engaging in security, police, or counter-terrorism operations directly.
 - encourages intelligence-sharing by obtaining and analyzing intelligence provided by the Member States, notifying Member States when it has 'information concerning them and of any connections identified between criminal offences',
- **European Union Military Staff**, which supports the Military Committee and the Political and Security Committee
 - responsible for early warning, assessment and operational support on external security matters including terrorism

Intelligence and International Organisations

- **UN** – Defense Intelligence Agency most important channel for intelligence support to UN peacekeeping operations
- **NATO** -The Intelligence Division of NATO's International Military Staff relies on intelligence supplied by NATO member states and the production of strategic intelligence estimates and other products
- **EU** has a Joint Situation Centre. Initially composed of staff from the Intelligence Division and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit tasked with preparing daily reports and press summaries
- **Police Sharing-** Police cooperation is one of the newer areas in which intelligence may be shared bilaterally or through an international organization such as Interpol and Europol
- **Interpol**-The International Criminal Police Organisation, known as Interpol to facilitate cross-border criminal police cooperation; today it has 182 member countries. It provides three 'core services': a communications network linking national police forces, maintaining databases and analytical services on criminal activity, and proactive support for police operations worldwide.

TOWARDS CROSS- BORDER SECURITY COOPERATION AND INTEGRITY

- The African Union political and legal instruments of article 4(b) of the AU Constitutive Act and Resolution AHG/res. 16.1 on border disputes between African States and the establishment of the African Union Border Program (AUBP)
- Successful inter-agency strategy in the Sahelo-Sahara region will include measures to specifically address:
 - the political economy of conflict in the Region
 - peace and reconciliation process
 - investment in border areas
 - coordinated approach to intelligence gathering and sharing to track and prosecute terrorists and criminal elements
 - establishment of a border control operational coordinating committee to facilitate strategic management and inter-agency coordination and operational capacity of national intelligence agencies and stakeholders

Recommendations

- Recommendations according to four clusters
 - **Regional ownership and concrete action**
 - **National interdepartmental coordination**
 - **Capacity building**
 - **International coordination and support**

Regional ownership and concrete action towards building confidence, maximizing and pooling existing resources

- The ACSRT to facilitate cross-sharing of information on terrorist and criminal elements as per Nouakchott Conclusions
- The LIAISON FUSION UNIT (UFL) to coordinate necessary tactical information
- Identify relevant Focal points across the multiple stakeholders and relevant role-players (ACSRT, UFL, ECOWAS and CISSA)
- CISSA equally has Regional Chairpersons, REC's, Members in the region with Focal Points too whereupon border security issues can be tabled
- Enhance the coordination and liaison and exchange of information and sharing between CISSA members in the region
- To produce alerts, briefs and regular assessments on the stability and security situation in the Sahelo-Sahara neighboring region. As the situation improves and stabilizes, the assessments can be conducted on a quarterly basis
- Assessment missions to the Sahelo-Sahara countries to evaluate the border cooperation situation on a regular basis.

National Interdepartmental Cooperation

- Modalities to enhance and deepen land border security cooperation
- Improvement of Border Management System
- Effective border control (management and operational capacity)
 - **Border Control and Policing**
 - **Joint Border Patrols**
 - **Mixed Border Posts**
 - **Cross-Border Security Committees**
 - **Communication with border communities**

Capacity Building

- Integrated and multidisciplinary approach to capacity building across all sectors
- Defining Jurisdictions and training in intelligence driven cross-border operations with an understanding of different jurisdictions
- Training programmes on border issues by African Union Border Program
- Training in intelligence methodology.

International Coordination and Support

- In the age of globalization and diffusion and open and artificial borders border security is about the security of citizens and protecting states.
- Global cooperation and exchange of information through international and multilateral organisations and regional organisations can only serve to strengthen through intelligence and analysis the fight against transnational crime and terrorism.

Challenges and Way Forward

- Securing open and artificial borders in extremely wide geographical areas
- Legacy systems and information and communication systems on border issues
- Effective and efficient coordination, communication and cooperation of interdepartmental, relevant operational structures and information coordination
- Requirements for high technology
- The challenges of international organized crime and terrorism must ensure that border security is structured in a manner to enhance security and safety of citizens.

Conclusion

- Given these threats and land border challenges the members of the AU have good reasons to want to engage in intelligence-sharing
- Common policies, including the development of trading blocks and common foreign policy, mean that the Member States increasingly face similar threats to their internal and external security
- It is not surprising, then, that they have developed institutions such as CISSA similar to the Club of Berne, Europol and the Military Staff to facilitate the exchange of intelligence.
- Effective intelligence sharing requires that participants hold a strong degree of trust in each other. The available evidence indicates that mistrust is a substantial barrier to full sharing of intelligence.



Thank You